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ABSTRACT
The ramp up phase is always the most risky part of any project, especially with a product
material the company and its partners have very little experience with. One result of this lack of
experience is frequent engineering changes to address design corrections and improvements.
High levels of change create uncertainty within both the supply chain and the engineering change
management systems. Just as a supplier may not be able to meet production requirements,
elements of the change process may not be sufficiently flexible to account for the level of change
the project experiences during production ramp up. A study of Bus Solution Systems' (BSS)
Super Hotel Coach (SHC) program change management system will show that unsuitable change
management system processes can cause downstream delays just as unsuitable supply chain
strategy can cause the same.
This thesis details a situation where the SHC program's Materials Management
Department (MMD) was having difficulty with visibility into the change management system.
As a result of the situation, SHC MMD did not have the ability to order parts on time. The effect
was that there were an increased number of parts needed for manufacturing jobs but were not in
stock, and sometimes yet to be ordered. The ultimate result of this problem, and the multitude of
other problems impacting the SHC not investigated in this thesis, was a bus program that was 2
years behind schedule in early 2009.
This thesis aims to correct the SHC MMD engineering change visibility issue by
examining the current state of the engineering change process through a shortage part case study
and by applying supply chain management strategy principles to extract part ordering
information from the SHC General Engineering Change Process earlier. This thesis also
proposes a long term systematic solution that would help prevent shortages from occurring in the
future. The intent of the recommendation is to reduce the chance of shortage occurrences so as
to prevent further delay of the SHC program.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Coach Bus Transportation Industry
The bus industry across the board has always had difficulty maintaining profitability.
Bus lines are always trying to reduce cost in order to remain competitive in a commodity
industry where low ticket price is the key to winning customers. In mid to late 2008, the bus
industry was in a fuel crisis where all bus lines had to adjust to account for fuel costs which
had more than doubled in a short time span. In order to offset such a dramatic increase in
operating expense, many in the bus industry introduced fuel surcharges, baggage charges, and
increased many other existing charges to improve marginal revenue from passengers to keep
ticket prices low. The industry needed a bus which consumed less of their biggest expense:
fuel.
Another substantial cost the bus industry has faced is noise taxes. These are taxes
levied by bus stations and federal governments on bus lines (and ultimately passengers)
associated with the noise the internal combustion engine creates during acceleration.
According to an unnamed article on the bus industry, of the passenger facility charges
collected by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) during 2008, $3 billion was
earmarked for noise abatement programs around bus stations. Individual bus stations have
also levied additional noise taxes on the bus lines. For example, it was reported that the bus
station in Sydney, Australia levies an A$3.58 noise tax on every departure.
The coach bus industry is dominated by two suppliers in the large passenger bus (i.e.,
greater than 50 passengers) segment: Bus Solution Systems (BSS) and Groundbus, a
subsidiary of the European company Lithuanian Autobus and Transportation Conglomerate
(LATC). In recent years, Groundbus has eroded BSS's market share, leaving essentially a
market split. In 2008, BSS delivered 3,475 coach busses while Groundbus delivered 4,483
with coach bus revenues of $58.25 billion and Lt65.0 billion, respectively, according to each
company's annual reports.
All of the busses that BSS delivered and the majority of the busses that Groundbus
delivered in 2008 were from their legacy programs (any program currently in stable
production). However, both companies have undertaken programs aimed at producing new
busses to address the gaps in the existing market and the changing preferences of the bus
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lines. For Groundbus, their new bus models are the AAA triple deck bus and the single deck
carbon fiber Ultra. For BSS, their new program is the carbon fiber Super Hotel Coach (SHC).
Both companies are attempting to fill market niches, by addressing the unmet needs of the bus
line industry.
1.2 BSS and the SHC Program
BSS, headquartered in Nimrod, Minnesota, is one of the major coach/school bus design
and manufacturing companies and the premiere coach bus manufacturer in the United States.
The BSS Company consists of two major lines of business. The first is Yellow School Bus
Systems (YSBS). YSBS accounted for $30.9 billion, or 53%, of BSS's 2008 revenue. The
second line of business is BSS Coach Busses (BCB), accounting for $27.4 billion (46%) of
BSS's 2008 revenue, according to their 2008 annual report.
BCB currently has four active legacy coach bus programs (as of 2009): the Super
Charlie Coach (SCC), Super Delta Coach (SDC), Super Foxtrot Coach (SFC), and Super Golf
Coach (SGC). In 2008, BSS delivered a total of 3,475 coach busses including 2687 SCCs,
130 SDCs, 93 SFCs, and 565 SGCs, according to the company website. Concurrently, BSS is
also in the developmental phases of the SHC.
In 2003, BCB wanted to design and build a bus to address their customers' specific
unmet needs. Their response was the SHC. The SHC was to be designed to attempt to lower
bus line operating costs through decreased fuel consumption and reduced noise footprint
during acceleration. These design improvements made the SHC one of the most desirable
busses on the market. Following the official announcement of the development of the SHC
program, over 8,108 firm orders from bus lines around the world were placed in the 5 years
following, making the SHC BSS's most successful coach program launch in the company's
history. The one downside to date: the SHC program has been marred by significant delays
in engineering and manufacturing which has resulted in delayed delivery of the first bus to a
customer.
1.3 Problem Addressed in this Thesis
To date, the SHC program has been delayed by almost 2 years from its original
published schedule. According to newspaper articles, the first SHC delivery was originally
scheduled in May of 2008. Further schedule slippage has been reported, resulting in first test
drive in the second quarter of 2009 and first delivery sometime in the first quarter of 2010.
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There are several reasons why this delay has occurred, including the introduction of a
revolutionary material (and associated new manufacturing techniques) and a supply chain
design that placed unprecedented responsibilities on first tier partners (suppliers on legacy
programs). One of the other causes of this delay, one which is less publicized, is from what
are known as part shortages. A part shortage occurs when a manufacturing job is scheduled to
commence but one or more of the parts required to complete the job are not in stock at the
time of request. Throughout the developmental phases of the program, part shortages could
be caused by several situations: late baseline engineering release (both design engineering and
manufacturing engineering), traveled work,2 quality rejection, engineering change, etc.
The most recent cause of part shortages has been engineering change. The SHC
program has had a significant number of engineering changes known as engineering change
notices, or ECNs. BSS had planned for a certain number of ECNs during initial planning
phases, but the actual number of ECNs that the program experienced has been greater. The
unanticipated number of changes has caused significant delays in certain areas of the
company, some of these areas may not have had the necessary resources to perform the duties
required to work these ECNs. The ultimate result of this situation has been part shortages.
In the SHC program, an internal company known as the Materials Management
Department (MMD) is responsible for purchasing all parts required at SHC Final Integration
to Delivery (FID). When a part shortage occurs, MMD is accountable for that part and is
measured on how many SHC part shortages are outstanding at any given time. In order to
avoid these situations, MMD needs as much advanced notice as possible because of the long
lead time of certain parts and the delays upstream in the change process. The question is: how
does MMD get the information needed from the change process as early as possible in order
to avoid part shortages? This is what is termed as the ECN visibility problem for the SHC.
1.4 Research Approach for this Thesis
In order to provide MMD with a solution to the ECN visibility problem, several things
were done. First, the SHC engineering change process was mapped in order to understand
how the current change process is actually operating. This included detailing the specific
steps, specific individual responsibilities in the process, and what step created any information
2 Traveled work is a job (or jobs) that was scheduled to be completed at a partner but is not completed at the partner.
The assembly is shipped to BSS containing the unfinished work. BSS installs these "traveled work" jobs upon
receipt of the assembly.
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needed to order parts. Subsequently, a more detailed study of the change process was
completed, including change process actual flow time calculation and individual step timing
through a parts case study. In order to create a full picture of the problem, interviews of the
different stakeholder groups were completed along with procedural reviews of the SHC
change process and adjacent processes. Furthermore, a comparison between SHC and SGC
management and change processes was completed. This may be used to show how and why
the SHC has strayed from the baseline schedule.
From the information gathered, a proposed short term solution was developed. This
short term solution attempts to address the part shortage issue immediately, sacrificing
usability for immediate results. This short term solution was then piloted across SHC MMD
to determine if there was any improvement in part shortages. A longer term solution was also
developed, which can be implemented at a future point in the program.
1.5 Summary
BSS's newest coach bus program, the SHC, has been hailed as one of the most
revolutionary coach busses in the industry. However, to date the program has been marred by
delays totaling almost two years. This delay has been caused by a range of different variables
from the use of a new material to a new supply chain paradigm. This thesis will explore one
of the lesser known reasons for this delay: part shortages, specifically focusing on those
shortages resulting from lack of visibility into engineering changes emerging from the
engineering change process.
This thesis will document the steps taken in order to properly diagnose the problem.
The first step was to map the current state of the engineering change process through
document review and stakeholder interview. To further define the current state, a process
flow time study was completed via parts case study. Secondly, a comparison study between
the SHC and legacy SGC programs was completed. Once all relevant information was
gathered, a short term solution was generated and piloted. A longer term solution was then
generated using background information and results from the pilot program.
1.6 Thesis Roadmap
This thesis is structured to first provide the background information on the legacy
programs (specifically the SGC program) as a baseline for the past managerial structure and
performance of BCB. In this same chapter, the SHC structure is presented and compared to
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that of the SGC program. Chapter 2 also includes a literature review of relevant academic
fields including supply chain strategy, supply chain processes and alignment, knowledge
management, and change management.
Chapter 3 presents information regarding the problems with the SHC engineering
change process. The majority of this chapter revolves around visibility into the engineering
change process, but also touches on other problem causes (quantity of change, engineering
resources, and new change types) and how the SHC program has a more difficult time
managing change. This chapter also includes the parts case study.
Chapter 4 attempts to illustrate that the change process is essentially a supply chain.
This chapter uses elements of the literature review to show this and how supply chain
strategies may be used to create a proper engineering change process strategy.
Chapter 5 takes all the information from chapters 2, 3, and 4 and presents the temporary
solution piloted during the internship. It provides the informational details provided to
purchasing through the pilot, along with the risks and benefits of this temporary solution.
Chapter 6 presents potential long term improvements to the current situation. Chapter 7
uses some of these recommendations to generate a long term solution. It also provides
reasoning why elements of potential long term improvements presented in chapter 6 should
not be implemented.
Chapter 8 presents the summary and conclusion for this thesis.
-19-
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2 Background
2.1 Legacy Programs
The four active legacy programs at BCB include the SCC (world's bestselling coach
bus), SDC (the world's second largest coach bus), SFC, and the SGC (BCB's last new
program launch). All four of the legacy programs are manufactured at BSS's facilities in the
greater Lancaster, PA area, with the full size coach busses (SDC, SFC, and SGC)
manufactured at the Knauers site and the SCC at the Reamstown site.
Although all four legacy programs had derivative programs launched, the most recent
program developed from the ground up is the SGC. The SGC program launched in the early
1990s and with the first delivery of a SGC to a customer five years later. This program
differed from the three other legacy programs in several ways: it was the first BSS bus to be
designed with computers, it employed new technologies, and engineering involved cross
functional teams across BSS and supplier companies. However, there were several aspects
which remained the same, including the make/buy strategy and majority of the processes.
2.1.1 SGC Technology
The technology on every new BCB coach bus program differs in some way from the
previous due to advancements in the field of automotive technology. Each new bus
program has some sort of technology incorporated into the design that BSS has no prior
history with. These advancements typically come in the form of systematic improvements,
as structural design remained relatively similar across all legacy programs. Two of the
major systematic advancements in the SGC program were the addition of cruise control
and in-service entertainment (ISE) systems.
There were production issues involved with both systems during the initial ramp up
phase of the SGC program. Since a cruise control system and the associated software
development were new to BSS, there were several problems with the system, including the
driving management system and the associated coding, which reportedly caused non-
crippling delays in the installation of the air conditioning system. Once the coding was
completely debugged, the SGC had around 1 million lines of code newly written for the
coach bus, which is approximately six times the number of lines reportedly produced for
the SDC. ISE also had production issues due to the wiring complexity of the system.
However, the first bus was delivered on schedule in 1995.
-21-
2.1.2 SGC Make/Buy Strategy
The make/buy strategy is relatively constant across all legacy programs. Large sheet
metal sections of the bus structure are provided by outside suppliers while the bumpers are
fabricated by BSS internally. For example, Chattanooga Structures (a former BSS
company headquartered in Chattanooga, Tennessee) supplies major sections for all four
legacy coach bus programs. Chattanooga Structures supplies the forward cab assembly for
the SDC, SFC, and SGC, while it supplies the entire bus structure (not including bumper)
for the smaller SCC.
The structural sections arrive at BSS from structural suppliers little more than a sheet
of metal fastened to the internal supports. Sections come in four pieces (left, top, right,
and underside) and commonly arrive with some brackets installed to allow for future
system installation, but no other system installation is completed by the suppliers.
Once the bus sections are fully assembled at BSS, they are joined with the bumpers
manufactured by BSS. Concurrently, BSS installs all the systems that are needed to make
the bus move (engine, suspension, electronics, etc.). There is a different level of make vs.
buy for each system, but there is a level (i.e., BSS doesn't make everything). For example,
the engines have always been sourced from an outside supplier while BSS has built the
major supports that connect the engine to the bus structure. They typically source small
parts for the engine support from companies like Chattanooga and source unbent fuel tubes
from a tubing company which BSS then bends and installs them between the fuel tank and
engine. There are situations where subsystems are fabricated by a supplier (i.e., aspects of
the air conditioning) but they flow directly to BSS for installation in the bus.
2.1.2.1 SGC Traveled Work
As with any bus production program, there are instances where uncompleted work
moves from suppliers to BSS, or across the internal boundaries of BSS. This is called
traveled work. Traveled work from structural suppliers is fairly easy to manage on the
legacy programs due to its simplicity. The majority of the structural traveled work
involves removing and replacing temporary fasteners that suppliers may have installed
in the structure because they didn't have the proper fastener size. This type of traveled
work is easy for BCB to manage because the work required to replace these fasteners is
fairly straight forward and the area around the traveled work is relatively accessible. A
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mechanic can easily identify and remove a temporary fastener through its markings and
determine how to adjust the penetration to accommodate the permanent fastener.
2.1.3 Legacy Supply Chain
The legacy programs' supply chains did not differ drastically across programs
because their make/buy strategies were mostly the same. BSS would receive everything
from raw material to quarter sections directly from suppliers. The figure below shows a
graphical representation of BSS's legacy supply chain structure.
Figure 1: BBS legacy supply chain structure
As can be seen from Figure 1, BSS was the central receiver of everything from raw
material (such as aluminum or spools of wire) to system components (LCD screens,
sensors) to structural components. This supply chain does not have very many levels as
BSS suppliers do not supply incredibly complex parts to BSS. As a result, BSS does the
majority of the manufacturing work to complete the bus.
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2.1.4 SGC Engineering
The SGC program was BSS's first foray into cross functional and cross company
design teams. Prior to the SGC program there was little input from suppliers regarding the
design of the parts they produce. BSS would design these parts down to the detailed
drawings and then hand them to the suppliers in order to fabricate the part. It was a build
to print strategy.
The build to print strategy remained in the SGC program; however there was
supplier input during the design phase which created a working together approach rather
than an independent designing and manufacturing relationship. The SGC's design build
teams were comprised of BSS design engineers, BSS manufacturing engineers and
engineers from the supplier producing the part being designed. BSS did still maintain the
clear leadership role in these groups. All three elements of the group were co-located in
order to improve communication and collaboration amongst the group members.
The group members worked together to design the overall part using BSS owned
processes and standards. This was ideal in that every cross functional team, regardless of
the supplier on it, would work to the same processes and standards, maintaining
consistency across the entire program. Once the overall piece was designed, BSS
engineers would hand the part off to the supplier where their engineers would work the
very detailed design (e.g., manufacturing design).
2.1.5 SGC Computing
On all programs prior to the SGC, the engineering drawings were completed by
drafters by hand on velum sheets. The advent of computers made velum and drafters
obsolete. The SGC program was the first BCB program which was fully designed in a
computer aided design (CAD) environment. From the initial stages of SGC development
through present day, 3D CAD was used extensively to design the SGC and its derivatives.
BSS received its first mainframe computers in the early 1990s and they were
immediately put to use to design the SGC. They employed an early version of CATIA on
these computers to design the majority of the bus. Once the design was nearing
completion, the design build teams would hold design reviews where they would do virtual
"fly throughs" of a 3D version of the bus. These fly throughs were intended to identify
any areas of interference between the different system arrangements. If interferences were
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observed, the design build teams would go back and compromise on an arrangement
suiting both systems. The ability to fly through the virtual bus was incredibly beneficial.
As a result of the fly throughs, there was a reduction in the number of times each drawing
needed to be revised. As a result, the SGC's drawings were revised fewer (about half as
many) times than its predecessor's (the SFC) drawings.
Aside from CATIA, the majority of the computing programs that the legacy
programs currently use were internally written by BSS. BSS tailored these programs to
address their specific needs for these programs.
2.1.6 SGC Scheduling
The SGC program was scheduled based on BSS's previous experience designing and
manufacturing a brand new bus. The figure below shows a normalized view of the time
duration between bus program go ahead and delivery of the first bus to a customer for all
programs up to the SFC. The SGC series reflected in Figure 2 is schedule as proposed for
the SGC at the beginning of the program.
1.8
1.6
1.4 -
1.2
1
0.8 -
0.6 -
0.4 -
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0
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Figure 2: Time duration between go ahead and delivery for SAC through SFC programs. Planned schedule duration for
SGC. Note: data normalized, SAC through SFC durations account for any schedule slip from the baseline schedule (if
applicable)
BSS delivered the first SGC to Greyhound Lines, Inc. in accordance with the
schedule reflected in Figure 2.
2.1.7 SGC Processes
The majority of processes across the legacy programs are very similar. Processes
such as first article inspection and assembly processes remain more or less the constant
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across legacy programs. Of course there are subtle differences from program to program,
but the differences are negligible. One of the major processes that remains consistent
across legacy programs is the engineering change process.
2.1.7.1 Engineering Change Process
The engineering change process in the legacy programs is fairly complicated as
there are several different types of change in the legacy programs. These different types
of changes are associated with specific revised engineering design report (REDR)
numbers (essentially a classification of the type of change). REDR numbers correspond
to typical change types such as basic release, engineering errors, drawing updates, and
committed changes. There are numerous different REDR numbers, so many that BSS
had to design and distribute a slide ruler type tool in order to aid engineers when trying
to determine the proper REDR number to use.
Following the determination of the correct REDR number and the approval of the
change, a single SGC change board would meet. The change board would include all
the stakeholders involved in the change. The change board acted as a forum for all
parties to discuss the change and, ultimately, agree to a project plan for the change. The
project plan is known as the engineering/design commitment schedule (EDCS) for
legacy programs. This schedule is a graphical plan of each step required to incorporate
a change in bus design. The schedule is based on quotes from each stakeholder for each
job needed to implement the change on the bus. It includes the milestones needed to
incorporate the change configurations. If there are any disconnects in quotes that would
prevent on time completion, the change board will bring the affected parties together to
determine a resolution that would satisfy the needs of the affected parties without
delaying manufacturing activities. The EDCS must include the implementation plan for
all events requiring date commitment such as new/revised parts, design reviews,
engineering release events, order by date, part rework, etc. This implementation plan
needs to be complete prior to the release of any engineering supporting the change.
As the name suggests, an EDCS is a commitment by each party to this agreed
upon schedule. It can be considered akin to a contract as it is signed by all parties
impacted by the change. Once this schedule is agreed upon by all the stakeholders,
stakeholders are accountable for meeting each of the dates they are responsible for. If
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any stakeholder should need to change any date in an EDCS, that individual must
provide the proper evidence that shows there is a valid reason for the delay. If there is
no valid reason, the request to change is rejected. BSS intentionally designed the EDCS
revision process to be difficult because they wanted to dissuade individuals from
delaying or missing milestones for arbitrary reasons.
A report was published internally to BSS summarizing the contents of the many
SGC EDCS documents. This report detailed all parts which were scheduled to have
engineering release within a set time period. This would provide all parties downstream
(contracts, purchasing, quality, etc.) notice of the work that would soon be coming at
them.
The change processes in all the legacy programs began as a paper based system
because those programs were started before computers were widely used across the
company. Even with this paper based system, changes were typically completed rather
quickly as the SGC program's liaison engineering team was considered incredibly
competent by those inside the company.
Changes could also be proposed by suppliers. If a supplier identified an
opportunity to improve manufacturability through a design change, they could propose
the change to BSS engineers (every change to design would have to flow through BSS
for approval). If the change was approved, BSS would open the drawing and change
the engineering drawings to reflect this improvement. One of the issues that resulted
from this business arrangement was that, when a change was proposed by a supplier it
made their job easier (e.g., a change to improve manufacturability), it reduced supplier
costs while BSS paid to make the change (in other words, BSS had to foot the bill for
this change while the supplier received all the cost savings). There could be contract
negotiations that would transfer some of the savings to BSS, but the savings did not
always outweigh BSS's cost of making the change.
2.2 SHC
The SHC was formally announced by BSS in 2004 based on the order of 463 SHC
coaches from Boston/New York based Fung Wah Bus Transportation Inc., the biggest launch
order of any in BSS's history. Following this announcement, the SHC continued making
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history for BSS. By September 2007, BSS reportedly had over 6487 orders for the SHC from
48 different bus lines which made it the most successful coach launch in bus history.
2.2.1 What makes the SHC technologically different?
The SHC's popularity is due to several technological improvements which made it
vastly different from any other coach bus in the world. First, the primary bus structure is
mainly made of a composite material while every other coach bus in the world uses
aluminum and other metals as the primary structural material. BSS sources estimate that
as much of 60% of the primary structure will be composite material. The chief benefit of
the use of composite material is that it is significantly lighter than any suitable metal,
which results in significant fuel savings. Additionally, since the composite primary
structure is a single barrel, the number of fasteners has been reduced significantly, further
reducing the weight of the bus.
Weight reductions are also seen in areas where BSS has replaced mechanical
systems with electronic systems. For example, BSS has replaced many of the mechanical
switches used to turn systems on an off with digital switches. Instead of physically
flipping a switch, the pilot will flip a digital switch on an LCD screen. As a result, the
SHC will include 2.6 million lines of computing code to run this system, its air
conditioning, and other onboard support systems, which is more than 2.5 times more code
than the SGC, as reported by a trade journal in the industry.
In addition to the reduction in weight, the jet engines make the bus more efficient.
BSS partnered with Broad Power (BP) and Spins-Harrelson to develop brand new internal
combustion engines for the SHC. Industry experts estimated that the improvement in
engine design will result in 8% better fuel efficiency and will be 50% quieter than
predecessors. The quieter engines will also help bus lines avoid noise fines associated with
operation in highly populated areas.
BSS has been able to increase fuel efficiency through other improvements to
aerodynamics and systems. With all of the efficiency improvements, the SHC is reported
to be at least 20% more fuel efficient than other busses present in today's coach bus
market. It is estimated to be 65% more fuel efficient than BSS's first coach jet, the SAC.
There are also improvements which make the SHC one of the most passenger
friendly busses. BSS has designed the windows with a digital dimming shade, where the
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window itself becomes opaque. This will allow passengers to dim or brighten their area of
the window as desired, making the ride more enjoyable.
Other improvements to the passenger experience include the use of LED lights to
allow the coach lighting to be more passenger friendly. Also, state of the art air filters will
make the cabin air the cleanest of any bus, eliminating even small viruses from the air.
The passengers will also be able to control the temperature in their area of the coach to
make the ride more comfortable.
2.2.2 Make/Buy Strategy
Not only does the technology of the SHC differ greatly from the legacy programs,
but the make/buy strategy also differs greatly from the legacy programs'. As stated above,
the legacy programs have a more vertically aligned manufacturing strategy where BSS
receives a lot of the low level parts and installs them on the coach bus. At the outset of the
SHC program, BSS made the decision to make the SHC program a more horizontally
integrated program where BSS performs the final integration to delivery (FID) role.
As a result of the decreased manufacturing statement of work, BSS entered into a
partnership with several different companies for the SHC program. There are 28 top-tier
partners which work closely with BSS to produce the SHC, 4 of these will manufacture the
major bus structures. Most of these partners, like Tokyo Bus Construction (TBC) of Japan,
Chattanooga Structures, and Venice Bus Solutions (VBS) of Italy, have worked as
suppliers on the legacy programs. Therefore, most of these top suppliers should know how
BSS works through their experience on legacy programs.
The main difference in the make buy strategy is that the structural suppliers will
manufacture larger sections of the bus. In legacy programs (except the SCC), structural
suppliers supply BSS with /4 bus section pieces (top, bottom, left, and right sides) which
would then be manufactured into a full size section at BSS's Knauers site. With the SHC,
BSS will receive entire rectangular sections approximately twenty five feet in length from
the partners. These full sections will have the supports and brackets installed inside just as
in legacy.
In addition to structural partners supplying full sections, partners now supply the full
bumpers to BSS. The bumper has historically been the pride of BSS's work. However, on
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this bus, BSS decided to outsource the bumper engineering and manufacturing to Seoul
Collision Protection (SCP) of Korea.
The structural partners will also receive semi-complete systems from other partners
(e.g., Lester Wiring, Inc. of Luxemburg for system wiring, Pedroia Cooling of the USA for
air conditioning, Ellsbury Tubing of Austria for fuel tubes, etc.) and install them into the
bus sections and bumpers. The structural sections are intended to be provided to FID with
the systems fully installed in each section.
Once system installation is complete, insulation is installed into the coach bus
sections by the structural partners. These coach bus sections are ultimately transferred to
BSS (some bus section integration work is transferred to another partner, Papelbon
Integration (PI), where further integration work is completed before being shipped to FID).
Once BSS ultimately receives these sections, BSS will integrate the sections
together. In the original business case, BSS would receive each coach bus section and the
bumper and essentially "snap together" each of the pieces to form the full bus. In an ideal
world, each one of the sections would match up perfectly where systems are easily spliced
together. BSS would do much less of the actual manufacturing and assembly work than it
did before. Therefore, the final integration role would be just as it sounds: final
integration only, no "real" manufacturing. The original BBS plan was to be able to do
final integration work in 2 days from the day the structural pieces entered the plant to roll
out of a complete, unpainted bus. Whether BSS will ultimately be able to meet this goal is
unknown.
It is useful to note that BSS has completely outsourced the entire bus. BSS
Companies still manufacture and integrate the steering column, spoiler, and interiors. 3
2.2.2.1 Traveled Work
With the change in make/buy strategy, there is also a change in the type of
traveled work that BSS receives from partners. Traveled work occurs for various
reasons, all to do with not having the proper parts in stock. It typically occurs when a
manufacturing job cannot be installed before the bus section is shipped to BSS. The
causes can occur because engineering may not be released to support manufacturing and
3 "SHC: International Team Facts." Accessed: 10 February 2009,
<http://www.BSS.com/coach/SHCfamily/dev team.html>
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the section is due to BSS before either the engineering is released or before
manufacturing can install the parts. It can also occur because suppliers cannot support
the need dates of partner manufacturing (i.e., they cannot provide the parts to the
partner as promised due to internal supplier problems).
On the SHC, no longer is the traveled work just structural in nature. Traveled
work can now range from replacing temporary fasteners (just as in legacy programs) to
installing complicated wire bundles or other systems. The traveled work of the SHC
differs greatly from that of the SGC. There are few similarities between traveled work
between the two different programs.
As stated earlier, legacy traveled work was mainly limited to jobs that required
removal of temporary fasteners and installation of permanent fasteners. The traveled
work that the SHC has experienced has been significantly more complicated. When the
first SHC bus sections were delivered to BSS in Knauers, PA, it was reported that there
were boxes filled with brackets, clips, wires, and other parts which were supposed to be
installed in the delivered section. In addition to having different parts to install, BSS
also needed the expertise to complete traveled work jobs. The manufacturing
technicians would require the proper direction to install these brackets, clips, and wires,
whereas in the SGC, it was well known, tacit knowledge how to replace the temporary
fastener with a permanent fastener.
Other situations do exist where BSS is given traveled work which is characterized
as "out-of-sequence" work. These situations occur when a partner cannot supply a bus
section with some parts, but has provided the section with all the other parts installed.
Out of sequence work occurs when a partner installs the follow on jobs because it is
easier for the partner to ship the bus section with these parts installed rather than
shipping them separate, where they could be damaged. BSS would then have to install
the missing parts "out-of-sequence" which could require the manufacturing technician
to remove significant sections of ducting, insulation, and other parts in order to install
the missing part(s). This makes the traveled work (from suppliers) on the SHC that
much more complicated than BSS has ever experienced. It is anticipated that the
amount of out-of-sequence work will diminish as the program ages because program
production will become more stable.
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2.2.3 SHC Supply Chain
The supply chain of the SHC differs greatly from the supply chain of the legacy
programs. This stems from BSS's choice of a new make/buy strategy whereby the major
partners install systems rather than provide subassemblies for BSS to install. Figure 3
shows the new supply chain structure for the SHC.
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the SHC supply chain. Items across top are common to all levels of the supply chain
When compared to the supply chain of the legacy programs (see Figure 1), it can be
seen that the new SHC supply chain is much more complicated. Where BSS was the
central recipient of almost every part in the legacy programs, BSS now only receives parts
from top-tier partners. The top-tier suppliers receive the less complex (but still complex)
parts from a wide variety of suppliers (some of which supply to several top-tier partners)
-32-
Lr
and integrate them into the very complex bus sections which are delivered to BSS. BSS
has, therefore, reduced the number of suppliers they have to work directly with by
adopting this model for the SHC program, and has created a much more horizontally
integrated program.
However, BSS's experience this supply chain structure has not been all good to date.
The structure that BSS has created is, in essence, a series of individual supply chains
lumped together. The top-tier partners manage their own supply chain with little BSS
oversight. Furthermore, these supply chains intersect in multiple areas because multiple
partners require the same parts, causing the jumble which can be seen on the left side of
Figure 3, which causes competition across the sub supply chains. With this structure, BSS
does not have direct control over the larger supply chain since each mini supply chain is
managed by individual partners with their own processes (i.e., there are no standard
processes across the entire supply chain). It, therefore, takes a much longer time for issues
lower in the supply chain to get to BSS whereas, in legacy programs, BSS had direct
contact with all suppliers on a regular basis.
2.2.4 SHC Engineering
Manufacturing was not the only aspect of BSS's business to be outsourced for the
SHC. Engineering was also outsourced for the first time on the SHC. Where BSS used to
do the majority of the engineering, BSS now owns little of the engineering. BSS entrusted
the same manufacturing partners, like VBS, TBC, and Chattanooga Structures, with the
bulk of the engineering of those parts of the bus they manufacture. BSS gave the partners
a taste of engineering with the design/build teams of the SGC, but full engineering of the
SHC product definition is completed by the partners with little BSS input and oversight.
The partners employ their own engineers to complete engineering, and in some
cases, outsource that engineering to sub tier companies. For example, Varitek Autobus's
(Ireland) statement of work was the rear section of the bus. Instead of designing and
building the floor for their section, they outsourced it to Ortiz Floor Services, LTD of the
Dominican Republic. However, outsourced SHC engineering cannot be approved for
incorporation into the bus configuration unless it is subsequently approved by the
applicable first-tier partner (in this example, Varitek would have to approve Ortiz's
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engineering). Outsourcing of engineering to sub tiers makes it that much harder further
downstream (most especially for BSS) to determine engineering intent of the design.
2.2.5 Engineering and Program Management Computing Systems
The majority of the engineering and program management computing systems used
on the SHC is off-the-shelf systems rather than the designed and built in-house systems of
the legacy programs. Like many in the engineering and design industry, the main
computing programs consist of the product lifecycle management suite supplied by the
firm The CAD/CAM People (TCCP). Other off the shelf software is used for tracking,
purchasing, and manufacturing.
2.2.6 Processes
The vast majority of the processes used on the SHC program were created
specifically for the program. Very few of the processes were rolled over from previous
programs because the thought was that this was such a radically new program (both
technologically as well as systematically) that the existing processes could not be applied
to the new architecture.
2.2.6.1 Engineering Change Process
The SHC engineering change process is one of the completely new processes for
the SHC program. BSS initially tried to simplify the change process by eliminating the
REDR process and replacing it with the General Engineering Change Process (GECP).
No longer do engineers have to determine the correct REDR number in order to
properly commit changes. Furthermore, the GECP has been simplified from the REDR
so that every change has the same general flow through the process. There are some
instances where the GECP process has been simplified for common change types (e.g.
an electrical wiring change that impacts only wiring) which don't need the level of
review as average changes.
Even though the process itself has been simplified, execution of the engineering
change process has now become more complex in that BSS no longer owns the
engineering. There are two different types of engineering change: a change that
impacts BSS FID's statement of work, known as an A type change, and a change that
only impacts a partner's statement of work, known as a B type change.
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B type changes are changes that only impact a partner statement of work. These
changes include situations where the change is internal to the partner design but has no
effect on any other partner including BSS FID. An example of such a change would be
a change in design of a bracket on the inside of the bumper that will be installed by SCP
from the first bus the change is committed for. Type B changes are not governed by the
GECP.
In contrast, type A changes are governed by the GECP and are the focus of this
thesis. Type A changes are considered most important to the BSS Company because
they directly impact their statement of work. Changes to work that BSS would
ordinarily complete (both engineering and manufacturing) when the program is
sustaining would be considered A type changes. These changes would be internal to
BSS, provided the change does not impact any partner's statement of work. All type A
changes are managed by the SHC program.
Type A changes become more complicated if the change impacts both BSS and
partners (the most common Type A change). The coordination is more complex
because communication is needed between companies which may be in different
countries, where the local language may not be English. Examples of A type changes
of this variety are:
* If a change is made to a BSS job, but it impacts a partnerjob. For example, BSS
decides to make a piece bigger, and in turn needs a stronger bracket. The existing
bracket is supplied and installed by Chattanooga Structures in the bus front section.
BSS and Chattanooga must work together on this change to determine a proper
solution, and implement the change together.
* A change is retroactive to any bus, including those which are currently under BSS
ownership and/or delivered. For example, assume there is a defective wiring design
in a partner work package that impacts all busses and BSS has busses one, two, and
three at FID. BSS is not going to ship this piece back to the supplier for retrofitting;
BSS will retrofit it themselves. Since this change is to a partner work package, the
partner will complete the design engineering for the change and BSS (potentially
another partner in certain circumstances) will create installation instructions and
retrofit the busses under their cognizance. These busses and other busses outside of
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BSS's current cognizance may need to have this change incorporated by BSS as an
out-of-sequence installation when they arrive at FID. As part of the change process,
BSS and the supplier negotiate an in-sequence installation bus where the change
will be incorporated by the supplier into the supplied bus section.
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Figure 4: BSS Engineering Change Process for A type changes
Figure 4 details the typical flow through the SHC's GECP. The GECP, as
designed, was intended to be used throughout all phases of the program: production
ramp up, stable production, and derivative development and production. The changes
originate from various documents such as nonconformance reports, traveled work, or
design improvements from engineers (step 1). These documents are then analyzed by
design engineers (DEs) from the responsible companies to determine if the change is
actually necessary. If the change is necessary, they assess the potential impacts of the
change, document principal requirements of the change, and build a business case
justifying the change (if necessary) in a document called a Engineering Change Request
(ECR) in step 2. The principal requirements are a high level description of the solution
to the problem or improvement in design. It typically includes a series of renderings of
the new part or assembly and what it takes to integrate the change into the bus. It would
also document any improvements in design over the previous design.
Once this is complete, the design engineer presents the ECR to at least one change
board for approval in step 3. There are several change boards, one for each functional
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area in the SHC program (e.g., propulsion, electrical, structural, etc.). All change
boards that a change impacts have to approve the ECR. The change boards meet at the
BSS facility; with any partner DEs meeting virtually. Following the presentation, the
change board either rejects the change and it dies right there or it approves the change
for further development. Following approval by the first change board, the ECR goes to
any other change board it impacts. Once all applicable change boards approve of the
ECR, the ECR goes to step 4 where a document called an Engineering Change Notice
(ECN) is written. This document is intended to organize the change and include all the
necessary schedule information to complete the change. The ECN document is used to:
* Document the detailed technical requirements of the change
* Identify the documents and data (including part numbers) that will be
created/changed/eliminated by the change
* Document schedule quotes
* Document the implementation plan for the change
The ECN document is supposed to include all the information necessary to cover the
above aspects, but sometimes it doesn't.
During the construction of the ECN document, it is reviewed by a second series of
change incorporation boards (CIBs). There are several of these, just as with the ECR
change boards (CB). The main function of these CIBs is to act as a forum for
stakeholders to negotiate the requirements of the change (e.g. a partner's
implementation schedule) and to review the ECN to ensure that it includes all the
required information. Once all the details have been ironed out and the ECN document
is complete, each of the CIBs impacted will authorize the change for implementation in
step 5. Once approved, a revision request is required to make a change to an authorized
ECN document. These revision requests are submitted to the change board(s) for
approval.
After the ECN is approved for implementation, the technical work required to
implement the change is started (step 6). At this point, DEs from applicable partners,
and potentially BSS, change their CATIA models to reflect the change. The part
numbers and part geometry are digitally defined at this step. Once design is complete,
the parts are reviewed and approved by the various group leads.
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The parts that comprise an ECN may make up several different manufacturing
jobs. Once all parts required to do a specific manufacturing job are completed and
approved, Manufacturing Engineering (ME) can now proceed with their work (step 7).
The ME writes their installation procedure in their Computer Aided Manufacturing
(CAM) program, which takes all of the information from the DE and formats it into 1)
lists of parts added, removed and reworked, and 2) the steps necessary to install the job
shipside.
Once the instructions are complete, the ME lead in the group approves the work
in the CAM system and the ME submits the job. Once the job is submitted, the process
becomes parallel in steps 8 and 9. There is a digital connection between the CAM
system and both the purchasing system (Enterprise Resource Planning, ERP, system)
and the Manufacturing Execution System (MES). While the job instructions are being
written in MES, SHC MMD can purchase parts as needed in the ERP system.
Once the purchase order (PO) is written by MMD, the supplier is notified of the
need for the part and then, in turn, produces it. Ideally, the PO is written with enough
time so that the lead time for the part is less than the difference between the PO issue
date and the manufacturing need date. If the difference is greater than the lead time, the
part should be in BSS's possession before the part is needed for installation in the bus.
If the difference is less than the lead time, BSS may have to expedite the part or delay
the manufacturing job in step 12. A delayed job because of a missing part creates a
"part shortage" condition which is closely tracked by MMD and SHC upper
management.
2.3 Summary
The SHC program is fundamentally different from the legacy programs across the
board. The following figure shows the fundamental differences between the SGC program
and the SHC program.
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Technology New: ISE, air conditioning, 1 New: Carbon fiber structure, mechanical
million lines of computer code systems replaced with electronic
equivalents, efficient engine, 2.6 million
lines of computer code
Make/buy Supplier relationship, BSS Partnership, BSS responsible for final
strategy responsible for most of assembly (minimal manufacturing)
manufacturing Structural: full, four sided sections
Structural: quarter bus sections supplied to BSS, bumpers outsourced
supplied to BSS, BSS completely System: majority installed by partners
manufactures both bumpers
System: integrated and installed by
BSS
Traveled Insignificant, commonly limited to Complex. Traveled work frequently
work replacing temporary fasteners involves significant part removal to
access the work area. More steps
involved
Supply Chain Essentially vertical. Suppliers Essentially horizontal.
typically deal directly with BSS
Engineering Design/Build Teams. BSS owned Partners complete most of engineering.
engineering BSS completes minimal final assembly
engineering
Computing CATIA for CAD. Internally CATIA for CAD. Off the shelf software
developed systems for much of the used commonly across the program
other programs (rather than in-house)
Scheduling On-time delivery of the first bus Close to two years behind original
schedule
Processes Many rolled over from previous Brand new for SHC program. Minimal
legacy programs. REDR process roll over from legacy programs.
for engineering change, EDCS Engineering change process (GECP)
ensures accountability lacks accountability
Figure 5: Comparison between the SGC and SHCprograms
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3 Literature Review
This chapter provides background information on supply chain strategy, supply chain
processes and process alignment, knowledge management, and change management as gathered
from relevant literature and research. The information presented in this chapter will be used later
in the thesis to provide useful insights into the SHC shortage problem.
3.1 Supply Chain Strategy
In the last 100 years, worldwide manufacturing industry underwent an incredible
transformation. Up until the early 1900s, the majority of companies provided products and
services to the local populace with resources coming from the surrounding area. With the
advent of such technological advances as the train, bus, automobile, and internet,
communication and transportation have become much faster and easier. As a result,
companies have had the opportunities to become more global through importing/exporting
and outsourcing. Hence the global supply chain was born. Proper supply chain strategy and
management is, therefore, much more important to a company than ever before because the
supply chain is exponentially more complex and is an opportunity for a competitive
advantage.
In order to properly cope with this increasingly globalized supply chain system,
companies have become reliant on the principles of supply chain management. The
University of Tennessee's Supply Chain Research Group has defined supply chain
management as:
the systematic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions within a
particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of
improving the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain
as a whole. 4
The supply chain must be aligned with the proper supply chain strategy in order to improve
the long-term performance that the definition puts forth.
Supply chain strategy has been researched heavily in the recent years as companies
themselves have become more global and their supply chains have become more complex.
Accordingly, the strategic choices required emerge "from an enterprise's assessment of
4 Mentzer, John T; Stank, Theodore P; Myers, Matthew B. "Global Supply Chain Management Strategy."
Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2007. p 19.
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externally based opportunities" which typically include aspects such as condition of global
markets, regulatory conditions, or potential supply chain partner characteristics like
management style, values (shared vs. unshared), and culture, where culture plays a very
important role.5 The key component of culture which influences supply chain strategy is
support from top management throughout the supply chain. Upper management is essential
because they have the ability to shape the strategic direction of the entire organization.
Furthermore, organizations where top management supports behavior consistent with the
supply chain strategy have the opportunity to be more successful managing their supply chain
than those that do not.6
The supply chain strategy must also be determined with respect to the product itself. As
Peter Kraljic writes in his article, "Purchasing Must Become Supply Management,"7 a
company's supply chain strategy is contingent on two different factors which can be used by
management to determine the type of supply chain strategy needed to minimize risk and
identify important suppliers. Managers must first explore the supply chain strategy's strategic
impact with respect to: value added to each product, percentage of total cost derived from raw
materials, impact of raw material purchase on profitability, impact of outsourcing
subassembly on profitability, etc. Kraljic writes:
By assessing the company's situation in terms of these two variables, top management
and senior purchasing executives can determine the type of supply strategy the company
needs both to exploit its purchasing power vis-g-vis important suppliers and to reduce
its risk to an acceptable minimum. Attractive new options, or serious vulnerabilities, or
both, may come to light as the assessment explores questions like these:
1. Is the company making good use of opportunities among different divisions and/or
subsidiaries? Combining the supply requirements of different divisions can increase
the corporation's total buying clout...
2. Can the company avoid anticipated supply bottlenecks and interruptions?
3. How much risk is acceptable? Vendor mix, extent of contractual coverage, regional
spread of supply sources, and availability of scarce materials all contribute to the
5 Mentzer, John T; Stank, Theodore P; Myers, Matthew B. "Global Supply Chain Management Strategy."
Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2007. p 22.
Mentzer, John T; Stank, Theodore P; Myers, Matthew B. "Global Supply Chain Management Strategy." Handbook
of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. p 25.
7 Kraljic, Peter. "Purchasing must become supply management." Harvard Business Review 61, no. 5 (September
1983): 109-117. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 18, 2009)
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company's supply risk profile. A company can often take action to lessen
unacceptable risk...
4. What make-or-buy policies will give the best balance between cost and flexibility?
If the company covers a large percentage of supplies from sources it owns, it will be
in a much better negotiating position to cover the remainder of its outside
requirements than its less-integrated competitors.
5. To what extent might cooperation with suppliers or even competitors strengthen
long-term supply relationships or capitalize on shared resources? ... [certain
companies are] increasingly involving suppliers early in the design process in order
to ensure better quality, lower cost, and "just in time" production.
Once the strategy is selected and implemented, Kraljic continues down a path focusing
on strengthening the organization. One of the key points he makes is that managing
purchasing in isolation from the rest of the company is impossible in today's industrial
environment and problems result from isolation:
Greater integration, stronger cross-functional relations, and more top-management
involvement are all necessary. Every facet of the purchasing organization, from
systems support to top-management style, will ultimately need to adapt to these
requirements. Concrete changes in the organization will be required to establish
effective organizational relations, provide adequate systems support, and meet new staff
and skill requirements...Too often the purchasing department receives information on
the company's business plans and objectives that is incomplete or improperly geared to
the tasks and time horizons of strategic supply management. Purchasing
executives...often lack adequate operating information with a three- to six-month time
horizon, which would provide early warning of short- to medium-term demand
fluctuations. The purchasing department needs these data for negotiating prices,
rescheduling supply quantities... In the absence of such data, supply bottlenecks, short-
term demand fluctuations, and ad hoc purchasing decisions are inevitable. In turn, the
company incurs higher time and money costs...
Complex companies with numerous products, multiple plants, and substantial
production for stock...are more vulnerable than are companies with a single product
line and/or considerable job order production... In either case, tailor-made systems
support will be called for. Such support might include: improvement of operational
flexibility through a rolling demand forecast system with a three- to six- month time
horizon... Improved systems support frees buyers and management from preoccupation
with day-to-day problems and enables them to focus on long term analytic work and
planning. Additional benefits include price reduction or savings, inventory reduction,
reduced clerical work, and better delivery and service.
The company will realize these benefits only if it uses the systems effectively. It must
foster consistent, cross-functional information flows and demands and induce line
managers to supply the required data for the purchasing information system. (One way
is to show them that most of the "new" data already exist and need only to be recast in
-43-
an appropriate format.) Finally, management must make certain that any major new
systems are user friendly.
A similar, but more recent, article appearing in Harvard Business Review details a
separate process to determine a supply chain strategy. This article, written by Marshall
Fisher and titled "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?", 8 focuses on how
individual products define the type of supply chain needed. The article first speaks to two
different categories of product: functional vs. innovative products. A functional product is
considered akin to a standard product, similar to a commodity, where product differentiation
between competitors is minimal or non-existent. Functional products are characterized by
predictable demand, stable design, address an established long term market need, satisfy basic
needs (e.g., pencils, hammers, shovels), and have low margin. An innovative product is as the
name suggests: a product which has differentiated itself from the competition through design
improvement. Innovative products are characterized by unpredictable demand, short life
cycle, and higher margins.
These two different types of products, functional and innovative, need fundamentally
different supply chains. The most important difference between the two supply chains is that
innovative product supply chains need to be flexible, while functional product supply chains
do not need to be flexible (but can be), but do need to be efficient. The primary reason for
this is the demand for innovative products is inherently unstable while demand for functional
products is typically stable because the demand forecasts are typically based on historical data
which results in a relatively accurate prediction. Functional product supply chains need to be
efficient to ensure lowest cost in a commodity market.
An innovative supply chain needs to be flexible so that it can react to the realized
market demand for that product in order to fulfill customer needs. If the supply chain is
inflexible, producers will either manufacture too much (creating excess inventory) or too little
(creating shortages). Similarly, partners or suppliers in an innovative product's supply chain
should be chosen based on partner/supplier speed and flexibility with respect to production
capacity and inventory positioning, not on low cost (although this variable should be
considered), in order to hedge against this unknown demand.
8 Fisher, Marshall L. "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?" Harvard Business Review 75, no. 2
(March 1997): 105-116. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 19, 2009).
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Once the supply chain structure is chosen, the company must constantly reassess the
state of the supply chain and improve when necessary. Fisher continues by stating that
companies with innovative products should invest in improving flexibility in supply chain
when hiccups occur because the return on the resulting increase in supply chain
responsiveness from a flexibility improvement is much greater than the return on an
improvement in supply chain efficiency. Furthermore, continuous improvement must be
focused on creating more value for the customer. Value management must always be
considered throughout the life of the supply chain in order to ensure that the organization at
least meets, if not exceeds, the needs of the customer.
Value management can be broken down into two specific subgroups: value creation
and value appropriation. "Value creation addresses the global supply chain's ability to offer a
better value proposition to customers than that offered by competitors. Value appropriation
addresses firms' abilities to extract value from the market at a sufficient level to meet earnings
and profitability targets." Furthermore, the supply chain strategy must be continually
managed and realigned to meet the value demands of the marketplace. 9 If the organization
lacks the proper value management, there is risk that the organization will lose market share
to its competitors. It is the task of every process and task in the value chain to help attain the
goal of delivering the highest value to the end customer.,l
3.2 Supply Chain Processes and Process Alignment
The primary challenge of any company is to create processes that align with the
product. A process is defined as a "repetitively used network of activities linked in an orderly
manner using information and resources for transforming 'object in' into 'object out,'
extending from the point of identification to that of satisfaction of a customer's needs." The
organization's management must properly design, establish, and develop the suitable
infrastructure in order to align all supply chain processes with the organization's objectives."
Fisher contends that there are "four tools" for aligning these processes to the innovative
product. The first tool is to ensure acceptance of demand uncertainty. The company needs to
9 Mentzer, John T; Stank, Theodore P; Myers, Matthew B. "Global Supply Chain Management Strategy."
Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2007. pps. 26-27.
o0 Flint, Daniel J; Gammelgaard, Britta. "Value and Customer Service Management." Handbook of Global Supply
Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. p 52.
" Larson, Everth. Ljungberg, Anders. "Process Orientation." Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management.
Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. pps. 103-104.
-45-
accept that there is uncertainty in the product which will put the company in the right mindset
for transformation of the supply chain, helping it look for ways to improve the supply chain to
hedge against this uncertainty. Fisher specifically cites an example from industries which are
oligopolies. In these situations, companies with less competition tend to find it difficult to
accept the inherent demand uncertainty because of the environment the company was exposed
to: low competition, weak retailers, and less demanding customers who have a tendency to
accept the actions of the company.
The second tool is alignment of processes to reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty in the
supply chain can be reduced by finding and employing new data sources into processes. By
finding and adding additional useful demand information to the supply chain processes,
supply chain analysts can be more confident that orders are correct. This additional
information can reduce uncertainty by providing more complete information to supply chain
analysts earlier so that they can make purchases according to the best information available,
rather than doing it with partial blindness.
The third tool avoids uncertainty in processes by reducing lead time in production and
increasing flexibility in the supply chain. This allows the supply chain analyst to use
additional information to make purchases that more accurately match demand.
The fourth tool is to hedge against any additional uncertainty not eliminated by the
previous tools. An example would be to change processes to require additional inventory
buffers or excess capacity at strategic points throughout the supply chain.
Fisher ends the article with the following statement focusing on how common supply
chain problems are in industry and how improvement rewards can be large:
Managers at many companies continue to lament that although they know their supply
chains are riddled with waste and generate great dissatisfaction among customers, they
don't know what to do about the problem. The root cause could very well be a
misalignment of their supply and product strategies. Realigning the two is hardly easy.
But the reward - a remarkable competitive advantage that generates high growth in
sales and profits - makes the effort worth it.
Any supply chain processes need to be continually monitored and improved to suit
customer needs and values just as the supply chain strategy itself should be. In order to
continually improve the supply chain processes, management needs to be able to measure the
performance of these processes. Performance measures of every supply chain process are
needed, both across firms and between firms. A holistic view of the process performance can
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show the health of the entire process while between firm performance measures will show
how the firms in the process are reacting to the adjacent firms in the process. Performance
measure of the entire process will be able to show if a process needs significant improvement
across the board while firm to firm performance can be used to pinpoint any underperforming
firms or any issues associated with intercompany linkages at each step in the processes.12
3.3 Knowledge Management 3
Knowledge management is defined in chapter 6 of the Handbook of Global Supply
Chain Management as "a business process that promotes organizational learning by
integrating a firm's approach to creating, sharing, and using its knowledge resources [where]
knowledge resources make up a firm's intellectual capital." 14
There are two major types of knowledge which need to be managed in any company,
explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge which can be separated from
the individual employees that make up the firm, and is typically easily defined and
documented. For example, explicit knowledge can be historical purchasing trends, demand
trends, engineering design changes, etc. Explicit knowledge is typically fairly easy to transfer
across employees and partnering firms. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not easily
documented because it is not easily separated from individuals. Tacit knowledge is in the
minds of the employees but cannot be easily defined on paper, but can be transferred by
employee to employee interaction (e.g., observation). An example of tacit knowledge is when
an individual knows the best practice for engineering a bracket on an bus. This is not easily
defined but can be learned through experience.
A competitive advantage can be created when a firm takes advantage of the knowledge
it creates. The more a company knows the better and faster they can react to the constantly
changing competitive environment. However, knowledge must be properly managed in order
to realize this competitive advantage. Knowledge management requires engagement of the
entire organization in the commitment to learning and, in order to succeed, competent
12 Mentzer, John T; Stank, Theodore P; Myers, Matthew B. "Global Supply Chain Management Strategy."
Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
2007. p 22.
13 Davis, Donna F; Chenneveau, Didier. "Knowledge Management." Handbook of Global Supply Chain
Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. pps. 87-102.
14 Davis, Donna F; Chenneveau, Didier. "Knowledge Management." Handbook of Global Supply Chain
Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. p 90.
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knowledge management must rely equally on three foundations: climate, processes and
infrastructure.
There must be a climate for knowledge management (similar to organizational culture)
that encourages knowledge management. This climate is important because knowledge will
not be effectively managed if employees are against knowledge management. Employees
must be willing to manage their knowledge in order for the system to work.
Knowledge management processes must support knowledge creation, knowledge
sharing and knowledge use. Knowledge is useless if it is not shared or used after it's created.
Knowledge management processes must therefore be aligned to encourage sharing of
knowledge across the company so that the company can take advantage of any and all
knowledge that is created by its employees. An example of a knowledge management process
would be the requirement for cross functional teams. This allows each member of a different
background to share their knowledge with other group members. Together, the group can use
their combined knowledge to complete their project with the best possible outcome.
Similar to the knowledge sharing in a cross functional team, knowledge infrastructure
must be aligned to support the sharing of knowledge across the company. Knowledge
infrastructure allows communication of knowledge through different channels, like computing
systems, phone systems, and social networks. Knowledge infrastructure is usually considered
akin to knowledge IT but is not effective unless the IT systems are filled with relevant
knowledge:
For IT to be an efficient communication channel, a firm must have standards for
collecting, storing, and sharing information using compatible platforms and centralized
databases. In firms that do not have an integrated IT infrastructure, workers routinely
manipulate data as it passes between functions. Data are downloaded from one
database, reformatted, and uploaded into the next application. This not only takes up
valuable time; it also raises the risk of introducing errors, thereby reducing the
credibility of the information. As a result, departments resort to collecting and storing
their own versions of critical information, isolating it on fragmented systems or "islands
of information." A user-friendly, integrated IT infrastructure ensures the
standardization, compatibility, and interoperability of systems and data required to build
knowledge management competence. 1'5
With proper alignment of knowledge management climate, processes, and
infrastructure, a company can benefit the most from the knowledge it has created and,
15 Davis, Donna F; Chenneveau, Didier. "Knowledge Management." Handbook of Global Supply Chain
Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. p 100.
-48-
therefore, create a competitive advantage. With the proper alignment of these three
characteristics of knowledge management, the company can more efficiently operate across
the entire enterprise. Specifically, it can help a company operate more effectively with their
partners in the supply chain because the information supporting the knowledge will be more
readily available to any partner who needs it. However,
Building knowledge management competence is not an easy task. It is far easier for
managers to focus on projects that promise short-term results than to take on the
mission of positioning a firm to compete over the long term in a global supply chain. It
is a complex, never-ending process.16
3.4 Change Management
3.4.1 Organizational Change Management'7
This section focuses on organizational change management. However, the principles
of organizational change management can and will be applied to engineering change
management later in the thesis.
Change management is those strategies and action plans which are used to transition
from a current state to a future state (whether it be a technical engineering change or an
organizational change). There are two different change management critical processes:
gaining buy-in of the change throughout the organization and executing the change. These
two processes are related when proposing a technical engineering change in that buy-in
(more commonly known as approval for implementation in engineering change situations)
of the change is required to execute the change. Buy-in of a technical change is garnered
by providing the technical data supporting the need for the change to those who will
approve or reject the change. Provided that this data is sufficient for the decision makers
to approve a change, the change management process will continue to executing the
change.
In order to successfully execute any change, a detailed execution plan is needed.
This execution plan is a project in itself and should be managed as a project, following all
of the prudent project management principles. Accordingly, the change management
should be structured into a "disciplined set of tasks" in the execution plan. The elements
16 Davis, Donna F; Chenneveau, Didier. "Knowledge Management." Handbook of Global Supply Chain
Management. Eds. John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. p. 102.
'
7Dittmann, J. Paul; Mello, John E. "Change Management." Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management. Eds.
John T. Mentzer, et. al. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. pps. 523-529.
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of a complete change management plan require complete and detailed written description
of the objective, scope, responsibilities, communication plan, and detailed completion
steps of each task.
The most critical plan component is the communication plan because, without the
proper communication plan, task details, responsibilities, timelines, etc. can go unheard.
This can prove fatal to any change management plan as the required work must be
completed but won't be if not received by those who are to take action. There are two key
steps in creating a proper change management plan. The first is to identify the key
stakeholders in the change implementation plan. Once these individuals and groups are
identified, the proper communication method to each stakeholder has to be determined. As
each stakeholder has different values and priorities, the communication to each has to be
appropriate to that individual or group so that each properly understands what is required
of them.
In order to properly execute the change management plan, there are several roles
which need to be filled. They are as follows:
1. Sponsor - the individual who submits the change for approval. This person provides
the justification for the change and proposes the solution for the change.
2. Change Owners - those individuals who manage the whole change process across all
groups.
3. Change Managers - individuals in each affected functional area who ensure the
individual steps in the change process are completed and completed on time. If any
step were to fall behind, the responsible change manager would be required to
determine and implement the required corrective action to get the step back on track.
4. Process Owners - individuals tasked with the responsibility to complete the details
of the steps (e.g., technical document update) required to fully execute the change.
The communication to each of these roles in the change management process must
include all relevant data needed to complete their responsibilities including, but not limited
to:
* Clearly defined tasks
* Responsibilities
* Schedules with clear completion dates
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"It is critical that everyone understand and buy in to the critical component in the change
process; without successful execution of each person's role, the change [implementation]
will fail. In the final analysis, everyone is a leader in a successful change process."
3.4.2 Engineering Change Management 1819
Engineering change management is similar to organizational change management in
that it attempts to manage a change that hopes to improve the design of the entity. In
organizational change management, that entity is the firm while in engineering change
management, the entity is a product.
Engineering change occurs for several reasons ranging from correcting design errors
to improving design. Engineering changes are inherent to the design process because
engineering "is an iterative rather than a purely linear process and traditionally are targeted
toward correcting mistakes, integrating components, or the fine tuning of a product,"
therefore, resulting in design improvement. Studies have shown that engineering changes
"consume one-third to one-half of engineering capacity and represent 20% to 50% of tool
costs, which can easily account for over US $100 million in large development projects."
Engineering change is managed through an engineering change process and its
supporting sub processes. The engineering change process consists of a sequence of
several events involving handoffs to and from several different stakeholders from a wide
variety of organizations. These stakeholders include, but are not limited to, engineers,
project managers, departmental managers, purchasing, quality, and planning. The
processing engineering change through the change process is typically "a rather
complicated endeavor" resulting from the multitude of stakeholder input and the complex
managerial approval sub process which may exist. In studies of the automotive industry,
depending on the complexity of the change, the engineering change process can require
from several weeks to over a year's time to complete a change. However, the actual
processing time (value added time) of changes is typically no longer than 2 weeks.
In their article "Accelerating the Process of Engineering Change Orders: Capacity
and Congestion Effects," Loch and Terwiesch identify three components that drive the
18 Terwiesch, Christian. Loch, Christoph H. "Managing the Process of Engineering Change Orders: The Case of
the Climate Control System in Automobile Development." Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1999.
Volume 16, pps. 160-172.
19 Loch, Cristoph H. Terwiesch, Christian. "Accelerating the Process of Engineering Change Orders: Capacity and
Congestion Effects." Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1999. Volume 16, pps. 145-159.
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length of the change process. The first driver is processing time. This is the time that it
takes to complete the content of the change. This includes, but is not limited to, such value
added activities as updating CAD, creating manufacturing instructions, and writing
purchase orders. The second driver is batch waiting. This occurs when waiting for other
changes of the same type to be completed so a group can be processed simultaneously.
The third driver is waiting time, aside from batch waiting. This occurs when a change sits
on an individual's desk in between change process steps or when the engineer does not
work on a change in order to work on his or her responsibilities. Essentially, it is the time
that the change remains in a state of pending.
Waiting time is typically a significant portion of the process completion time. A
studies of an airframe manufacturer and mechanical controls company showed that the
value-added time for an engineering change was shown to be 1.75 days over three weeks
and five days over five weeks, respectively. Therefore, only 8.5% and 21%, respectively,
of the total processing time was value added. Further results of the study across all white
collar processes show that value added time can be lower than 5% of total processing
time.20
In their other article "Managing the Process of Engineering Change Orders: The
Case of the Climate Control System in Automobile Development," Terwiesch and Loch
identify five key contributors to the long processing times through the change process:
complex approval process, snowballing changes, scarce capacity/congestion,
setups/batching, and organizational issues. They describe these contributors as follows:
1. Complex approval process: multiple decisions, approvals and handoffs can take up
to 10 days in the study completed by Terwiesch and Loch.
2. Capacity/Congestion: lack of proper engineering capacity for a department will
cause a queue in engineering change work for the department. Congestion can occur
due to the fact that arrivals of engineering change for a department are stochastic.
Backlogs can occur when a "large wave" of engineering changes flows to a
department even when the department has an acceptable capacity.
20 Blackburn, Joseph D. 1992. "Time-based competition: White-collar activities." Business Horizons 35, no. 4: 96.
Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 30, 2009).
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3. Setups/Batching: "mental" setups occur when an engineer picks up an engineering
change that he or she has not worked on recently (e.g., over a day). He or she must
get themselves back "up to speed" on the details of the engineering change.
Batching occurs in situation where similar changes are grouped together in order to
realize economies of scale. In certain situations it is cheaper to process two similar
changes at once. An example of this is when it is cheaper to process two changes
that impact the same CAD model. By grouping these two changes together, the
CAD model has to be opened only once. Delays can occur when the first change is
waiting for the second change to complete upstream sub processes.
4. Snowball effect: by changing a part, the couplings between the interfacing parts
may need to also be changed. If these couplings are not initially considered, future
delays in the engineering change process could occur.
5. Organizational issues: the culture of the company can create delays in the change
process. Terwiesch and Loch point to an example where a company had a culture
for cost management, and the company's metrics and incentives reflected this
culture. There was not a culture for time management. This resulted in delays
because, even though slight cost overruns were heavily scrutinized, two week delays
were overlooked even if it was a time sensitive project
Terwiesch and Loch conclude that the complex approval process,
capacity/congestion, and setups/batching result from issues with business process
management. The other two, snowballing and organizational issues, result from the
responsiveness and culture of the organization. As a result, they present potential
improvement activities attempting to improve or eliminate these delays through process
improvements or cultural changes. These are as follows:
1. Eliminate unnecessary steps: eliminate unnecessary oversight, bureaucracy, data
reconciliation, etc. A process stream mapping exercise can be completed to identify
unnecessary elements of the engineering change process. This will also reduce the
number of handoffs in the process.
2. Reduce utilization and variability: reduce utilization through hiring, if possible.
Utilization can also be decreased by increasing the flexible capacity, better IT, and
pooling of resources. Increasing flexible capacity through use of overtime helps when
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engineers are overloaded. Better IT will help employees work more efficiently.
Pooling of resources can allow individuals to assist others when there is slack in their
work.
3. Ensure fast feedback and turnaround: requiring fast turnaround of issues involving
key couplings and interfaces will help minimize snowballing. The theory is that a fast
turnaround time and resulting quick finish of the change. This will minimize the
chance that other changes are created that may impact the same parts as the first
engineering change. It makes change execution less complex.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents the literature review on supply chain strategy, processes and
alignment, knowledge management, and change management. The literature review will
ultimately be applied to the SHC program and its change process further into this thesis.
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4 Problems with the SHC Engineering Change Process
The SHC General Engineering Change Process (GECP) was built from the ground up
specifically for the SHC with little roll over from the engineering change processes of the legacy
programs. The intent was to produce a process which was a simpler change process than the
legacy change processes (the REDR process). In addition, BSS management felt that a newly
designed change process was required as the legacy change processes would be unsuitable for
the new supply chain strategy of the SHC. However, there have been many problems in the SHC
program with respect to the GECP.
This chapter presents some of the problems with the SHC program that have caused the
delays the program faces. The production delays are significant and have been caused by several
things including the current state of the SHC engineering change process. This problem impacts
the purchasing department (MMD) greatly because they do not have proper visibility into the
change process that would allow them to determine which parts will need to be ordered in the
future.
Furthermore, this chapter will look examine one of SHC purchasing's major metric: the
part shortage metric (a part shortage is when a part needed by manufacturing is not in stock to
support a manufacturing activity). In order to diagnose the root cause of the shortages created by
engineering change, a parts case study was completed to map the average development timeline.
After discussion of the parts case study, the root causes of the case study results are discussed.
4.1 Delays
There have been delays in the engineering change process (the GECP) throughout the
history of the SHC program. Specifically, there have been delays in processing both ECRs
and ECNs due to the volume of these documents passing through the engineering groups and
change boards. BSS predicted that it should take no longer than 8 days to complete an ECR
and 17 days to complete an ECN. However, the actual completion times for each ECR and
ECN average 33 days and 67 days (all numbers normalized for the actual flow through ECR
and ECN stages to add up to 100. Predicted flow multiplied by same factor), respectively, a
factor of four times what was originally expected. The current state of the GECP could be
due to several reasons including, but not limited to: the quantity of engineering changes,
BSS's available manpower, and the focus of the changes.
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4.1.1 Quantity of Change
As with any forecasting, BSS's initial change forecasts for the SHC had a wide
range. This is expected as the new supply chain and engineering structures had not been
used in BSS coach or at the partners, so there was no precedence to base any forecast on.
Many people in management interviewed feel that the number of changes that have been
approved for implementation by the SHC program has been on the high end of the
forecasts, if not greater. There is little data which shows average number of changes for
legacy buses due to their change processes being paper based during ramp up. However,
many managers feel that the number of changes to date through the SHC program has been
greater than the number of changes impacting any other legacy program during their
respective ramp up. What is known is that legacy programs' change notices focused on
design improvement situations, correcting engineering mistakes, and weight reduction
during ramp up. The SHC program has the same three causes of change but there are two
additional causes for ECNs: traveled work and out of sequence installation changes.
4.1.2 Engineering Resources
A second potential cause for the current change flow time may be due to the fact that
there may not be sufficient resources to properly manage and work the quantity of
engineering changes. In a situation where management predicted that 600 parts would be
received into BSS FID for SHC manufacturing number (M/N) 21 1 but 15,000 parts were
actually reportedly received from the partners, it can be assumed that management did not
have the necessary manpower at hand to tackle this situation. Although this situation
occurred significantly before the writing of this thesis, BSS may not have been able to
successfully pull itself completely out of the hole created by M/N 1 because of the
continuous addition of other traveled work from delivery of successive busses (i.e., M/N
2+) and sufficient engineering talent may not have been available to fully address this
problem.
4.1.3 Additional Change Types: Traveled Work and Out of Sequence
A third potential cause is the nature of the changes. Both traveled and out of
sequence work are accounted for on ECNs because the change process is used to manage
21 Manufacturing number (M/N) refers to the number in the order of bus production. SHC M/N 1 would be the first
bus built and tested (not necessarily delivered due to the first 3 busses being for lengthy test programs).
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all work statement transfers (i.e., manufacturing responsibility transfers from a partner to
BSS FID). This includes transfers that may be permanent or may be temporary (i.e., a
certain range of busses - say M/N 4-10 - may have the same traveled work jobs transferred
from a partner to BSS FID).
With the addition of traveled work and out of sequence installation as prominent
engineering change causes in a new supply chain paradigm, BSS may not have the
experience dealing with these new types of changes (on legacy programs, major traveled
work occurred when the bus moved from one place in the BSS factory to the next step,
making traveled work easy because the teams were collocated). Adding to the problem,
they also may not have had all the engineering information necessary to rapidly correct the
situation. They may not have had the necessary engineering information because BSS
does not own a lot of the SHC's engineering and, therefore, lack the product life cycle data
to determine the engineering intent of the traveled and out of sequence work. Without the
engineering intent, BSS engineers would either have to contact the partner engineer
responsible for the design of the part(s) or potentially need to reengineer the parts to gain
the required information in order to disposition the ECN. This situation would tend to
increase the performance time of any ECR or ECN.
A specific example of this situation reported in the press occurred when the VBS
section of M/N 1 was delivered to the Everett site. Along with the large bus section also
came dozens of crates filled with parts which were supposed to be installed by VBS but
were not. The crates did come with instructions on how to install some of the parts, but
they were either insufficient installation instructions or were written in a language other
than English. There were some parts that were supplied without any installation
instruction at all. This is the environment the SHC program faces because engineering has
been outsourced to partners, an environment which BCB had never experienced.
4.2 Engineering Change Part Visibility
One of the major problems that the SHC program has been facing is visibility into the
change process. Some of the stakeholder groups, namely MMD, have found it difficult to
timely determine which parts are required for purchase from ECNs. Continually, there were
instances where ECN part purchasing information did not flow downstream to MMD for
purchase until it was too late to purchase the part outside of lead time. There have been
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extreme instances where MMD was informed of the part need the same day that
manufacturing requested the part for installation on the bus. However, the most common
situations have been where MMD is not informed of the need to purchase a part until within
lead time. 22 Any delay in steps 1-7 of Figure 4 (e.g., late engineering release) can be a cause
of an impingement on the part's lead time.
When situations occur that cause BSS to order within lead time, BSS must either pay
expediting fees to receive the part on time or delay manufacturing activities. BSS often
chooses to delay the manufacturing activity and, when this happens, it creates a part shortage.
Part shortages occur when a part is needed for a manufacturing job but one or more of the
required parts are not in stock. One shortage occurs for each unique part number that is not
available to complete the manufacturing job. Hence, if a single manufacturing job for a single
M/N is short seven parts, but four of the parts are one unique part number, two of a second
and one of a third, the total shortage count will be three with a quantity of seven. Change is
not the only cause for a part shortage as shortages occur for a myriad of reasons. Other
reasons that cause a part shortage include supplier delays, rejection tags, and shipped short
orders (i.e., installation kits shipped missing a part or parts).
4.2.1 Shortage Metric
The total number of active shortages is one of the major metrics which SHC MMD is
judged on. When shortages are inordinately high, upper management looks to MMD
leadership to correct this problem. An extreme example of an inordinately high shortage
count occurred in 2007 when the SHC program was short over 5,000 fasteners, as reported
in the local media. Figure 6 shows this metric which MMD is judged on. It is a graphical
representation of shortages on the SHC program over a period of time.
22 BSS is within lead time if the lead time is greater than the number of days between purchase date and
manufacturing need date
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Figure 6: SHC part shortages broken out by engineering change associated and no engineering change association
The three lines on Figure 6 represent the total number of shortages, number of
shortages associated with an engineering change (change shortages), and the number of
shortages not associated with an engineering change (non-change shortages). Essentially,
a change shortage is a shortage that is associated with a part number that was added to the
bus definition by an engineering change (i.e., it wasn't in the baseline design). A non-
change shortage is associated with a part that was part of the baseline design.
As can be seen, the total number of shortages has substantially decreased over this
time period. The number of non-change shortages seems to mirror the decrease of overall
shortages. This would suggest that the SHC program is doing an effective job improving
their shortage position with respect to non-change shortages. This is what is expected at
the end of the ramp phase of any product design and development project: gradual
improvement. As the design becomes closer and closer to the final configuration, issues
resulting from the original design (whether they are due to part shortages, engineering
changes, etc.) decrease over time as the wrinkles are ironed out and more knowledge is
gained on the product.
However, as can be seen in Figure 6, change shortages do not seem to improve. This
data series remains relatively flat, with only a negligible downward trend. This would
suggest that parts associated with engineering change are not responsive to the current
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initiatives aimed at reducing these shortages and that these shortages are still at the
beginning stages of the ramp up phase because there is not a downward trend (a horizontal
curve means that as soon as shortage is cleared, there is another new shortage to take the
place of the cleared shortage. At the end of the ramp up phase, there should be a
downward trend as more shortages should clear than should open. This, therefore,
suggests that the change process has not reached the end of the ramp up phase). In order to
reduce change associated shortages, something else is needed in order to improve these
shortages associated with engineering change in order to see the same trends as the non-
change parts. A graph of the number of manufacturing jobs affected by shortages has
similar trends as those in Figure 7.
Manufacturing Jobs Impacted
- Total Manufacturing Jobs Impacted
- • - Associated w CN
---- Not Associated w CN
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prevented from ever happening. This can be accomplished by ordering earlier in the
process.
4.3 Engineering Change Parts Case Study
A case study was completed in order to understand the root cause of the part shortages
associated with engineering change. A sample was taken on a random day during the
internship and studied for average flow times through the GECP.
4.3.1 Engineering Change Parts Case Study Procedure
4.3.1.1 Sample Generation and Criteria
The BSS shortage tracking program (referred to as STRACK) was used to
determine the part numbers considered a shortage on the randomly chosen day. The
criteria used to determine which parts are impacted by engineering change are as
follows: a field in STRACK known as installation instruction contained the letter
combination ECN (typically FIDECN) and/or a change notice number was associated
with a given shortage record. Once all part shortages associated with engineering
changes were determined, flow times through the engineering change process had to be
determined.
4.3.1.2 Determining Associated ECRs and ECNs
In order to determine flow time, the first step was to determine the ECRs and
ECNs associated with each shortage record. This was completed by using the CAD and
CAM systems to locate the ECN(s) associated with the shortage record. The CAD
system was used with the part number associated with the given shortage record to
determine what ECN created the part. The CAM system would be used with the
installation instruction number to determine the ECN associated with the creation of
that installation instruction. Commonly, the ECN that created the part did not match the
ECN that created the installation instruction. This is reasonable because parts can be
used in several different locations throughout the bus, but the part may have been
initially created for another installation instruction but was found to be useful in another
application later in program development.
In order to determine the ECR associated with the ECN, each ECN document was
opened from the SHC ECN database. Each ECN must have a referenced ECR in its
contents as an authority to proceed with the ECN.
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4.3.1.3 Determining Step Flow Times
In order to determine the flow times in each step of the change process, the
document created at each step was opened and the start/finish data mined out. The ECR
duration for each ECR impacted by the shortage record (one from each the CAD and
CAM data, or one for both the CAD and CAM data, if ECN number matched) was
calculated by accessing the ECR in the ECR database. The duration of the ECR step
was calculated by taking the change board approval date of ECR and subtracting the
ECR open date, both in the ECR document.
The ECN duration was calculated in the same fashion as the ECR duration. ECN
duration was calculated taking the authorization (approval to proceed with change
implementation) date and subtracting the ECN open date. In certain situations, ECNs
had yet to be fully authorized but had been partially authorized at some point in the
history of the ECN. In these situations, it was assumed that the partial authorization
date was the date that approved the part or installation instruction for implementation.
If the ECN had both a partial authorization and full authorization event in the history,
the part or installation instruction ECN approval date was investigated to determine if
the part or installation instruction was authorized through the partial or full
authorization event, then the duration calculated accordingly.
The CAD system was used to determine the duration of part design. Creation and
approval date were available in the CAD data for each part. Duration was calculated by
subtracting the creation date from the approval date.
The CAM system was used to determine the approval date of the installation
instruction. The remarks section of the installation number data file provided the
approval date for each revision of the installation instruction. Revisions typically were
used to change (typically add) effectivity of the installation instruction (i.e., if the
installation instruction was initially assigned to M/Ns 1-3, but needed to be extended to
included M/N 4, a revision of the installation instruction would be completed to extend
effectivity to M/N 4). The revision data would be used to determine which revision of
the installation instruction impacted the respective shortage record (each shortage
record included M/N data).
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The duration of installation instruction writing could not be determined from the
information given in the CAM system. However, there is a standard completion time
for installation instruction writing and approval on the SHC program. This time was
used as the average duration for all installation instruction writing to approval.
Although various interviews did yield a range for actual completion times, this
information was qualitative and did not provide a distribution across this range. And
since sufficient quantitative data could not be found in order to properly calculate an
average installation instruction writing duration, the standard completion time was
therefore assumed to be a sufficient estimate of average completion time.
Data from the STRACK program was used to determine when the shortage record
was created. Data about purchase order date was not provided in the shortage records
and, therefore, purchase order date could not be determined. Each shortage record was
then tracked on a daily basis in order to determine if and when the record had cleared
(i.e., the parts were received). Once the record had cleared, the duration of the shortage
could be calculated.
Once all data was accumulated, records with insufficient information were
eliminated. Situations where records were eliminated due to insufficient information
include, but are not limited to:
* Installation instructions did not contain the necessary approval information
* Shortage records did not contain an installation number (i.e., the field could be
filled with a temporary value which would include the letter combination ECN)
* CAD and CAM data did not provide ECN numbers
* CAD and CAM ECN data was incorrectly referenced in documents (typically
associated with incorrectly inputted numbering)
For the remaining shortages with sufficient information, the data was then
averaged across different groupings of the sample. Groupings were generated by
comparing commonalities across the different records' data sets. The different groups
were formed because the data behind each grouping is fundamentally different and the
groupings were formed in order to avoid skewing the data due to differing
circumstances. The different, mutually exclusive groupings are as follows:
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* All records with committed ECNs and installation instructions (considered
"normal" parts in the case study)
* All records with uncommitted ECNs in either the CAD, CAM, or both databases
(essentially, they are changes that have yet to be authorized for incorporation on
an bus but work has started)
* All records without an installation instruction currently approved against either
the installation instruction number or line number associated with the record. The
first occurs when an installation instruction number has been determined but it has
yet to be approved. The second happens when an installation instruction is
approved for certain line numbers, but has not been extended to the line number
reported by the shortage record.
* All records that are associated with standard parts (parts which are widely used
throughout the bus - examples would include standard fasteners)
4.3.2 Sample Defining Data
There are several ways to characterize the data to show the true picture of what the
sample consists of. Firstly, of the total shortage records which conformed to the search
criteria, 42% had sufficient data to provide a full picture of the current state of the change
process. Of this 42%, Figure 8 below shows the breakdown of ECR data.
Engineering Change Request Breakdown
2%
6%
T No CAD ECR
E No CAM ECR
* No CAD or CAM
ECR
N CAD/CAM ECR OK
Figure 8: ECR data breakdown for the 42% sample
Figure 8 shows that a percentage of the records did not have useful ECR data (i.e.,
dates were missing from the ECR report) or the ECR data could not be found. These
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records were still considered as part of the sample because the ECR step is not a defining
step and is relatively minor when executing the actual change. However, these nonexistent
ECR date values were omitted from the averages across the sample (i.e., there were no
unnecessary values of zero included in the sample averages). This is significant because
the data related to the ECR duration reflected in the parts case study results do not go
across the entire sample. Should the ECR data exist for all parts in the sample, then the
results could potentially be different. However, this effect is considered negligible. It is
important to note this because the steps downstream from the ECR step have been included
in the final sample averages for the parts case study, even if they didn't have the necessary
ECR data.
Engineering Change Notice Breakdown
2%
0% 2% 1% 2%
* Uncommitted CAD
ECN
E Uncommitted CAM
ECN
* Partial Commit CAD
ECN
U Partial Commit CAM
ECN
a CAD and CAM ECN
Uncommitted
a CAD and CAM ECN
Partial Commit
a CAD and CAM ECN
Fully Authorized
Figure 9: ECN breakdown for 42% sample
Figure 9 shows the breakdown of the ECN status for the sample. It is interesting to
note that a small percentage of the shortage records are associated in some way with an
uncommitted ECN, either in the CAD, CAM, or both. This is important to note because, by
FAA regulation, parts associated with these changes cannot be installed on the bus until the
ECN is authorized.
There is a larger percentage of the sample that is associated with partially committed
ECNs. This is considered acceptable because parts of the ECN are authorized for
incorporation. As stated before, it is assumed that all parts associated with a partially
committed ECN are related to the sections of that ECN which are committed. This is
significant because it is a big assumption. There are typically several revisions in the
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ECNs life where the ECN is at a state of partially committed. There is a chance that parts
would be approved in a partially committed revision other than the first one (i.e., the start
date is reflected as earlier than it actually was). This assumption has the potential to skew
the data, making the average ECN step shorter than actually reflected.
Sample Breakdown, Standards
11%
0 Standards
a Non-Standards
Figure 10: Standard vs. Non-Standard breakdown for 42% sample
Figure 10 shows that a small percentage of the sample is associated with shortages of
standard parts. These items were removed from the larger sample because the CAD data
typically does not associate with an ECN. This is acceptable because these parts are
typically designed much earlier in the program for the sole intent of using many times
across the bus. The lack of ECN data from the CAD system is, therefore, expected and
accepted as normal.
This is a significant variable because these parts are inherently different from the
other 89% of the parts because they are used commonly throughout the bus. Since they are
so common (i.e., they may have a standard stock level with a reorder point), the cause for
these shortages could be significantly different than the cause for any of the other parts
groups (e.g., improper ordering rather than late engineering release).
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Figure 11: Installation instruction breakdown for 42% sample
Figure 11 shows that 15% of the sample does not have installation instructions
written to cover the shortage record. What is interesting about this is that, without the
installation instruction written and approved, there should be no demand in the BSS ERP
system, and there is nothing driving the issue of a PO. Essentially, this means that there is
a manufacturing need for a part that does not have the installation instruction written to
install the part and no demand in the ERP system telling MMD to purchase.
Aside from characterizing the breakdown of ECN data, there is another aspect which
needs to be examined. Following the completion of the study, there were several shortage
records which remained open for the duration. Figure 12 shows the breakdown of the
records closed vs. the records which remained open at the conclusion of the study.
To properly explain the significance of the data in Figure 12, in a hypothetical
situation, say the randomly chosen day was July 1. On July 1, the sample was taken of all
the parts which were considered "short" in the STRACK program, totaling 100 parts. Of
this 100 parts, 42 of the parts had sufficient information for the parts case study (i.e., the
42% defining the parts case study). These 42 parts were the focus of the study throughout
the duration of the study (i.e., no more were added as new shortage reports were created in
the days following). If the study ended on August 1, of the 42 shortage records in the
sample, 81% (or 34) of the part shortage records had been closed (i.e., the parts for these
34 records were received by BSS FID, therefore satisfying manufacturing need).
However, at the end of the study there were still 8 parts which had not been received.
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Installation Instruction Breakdown
2%
N Instructions Don't
Exist
* Instruction N/A to
Req'd M/N
Instruction
Acceptable
These 8 parts were split out from the 34 because their shortage duration is unknown
because there is no way to tell when the close date for these will be. This will hopefully
prevent significant skewing of the data. However, it should be noted that if the study was
of a sufficient length, the true average shortage duration could be calculated and would be
a better gage of the duration.
Sample Breakdown, Standards
11%
_a Standards
ii Non-Standards
Figure 12: Shortage record status at the conclusion of the study
Figure 8 through Figure 12 each have the ability to skew data slightly. In order to
minimize the impact of the data in Figure 8 through Figure 12 on the results of the parts
case study, the data from the sample was split up into four different categories, two with
sub groups, for proper analyzing.
4.3.3 Study Results
Each shortage record was characterized based on the data that could be gathered for
the engineering change parts case study. These four groupings are as follows:
1. Normal Parts - parts which provide sufficient data that are not standard parts, do not
have uncommitted ECNs against them, and do have an applicable installation
instruction. New parts are broken down into two subcategories as follows:
a. Parts with closed shortage record at end of study
b. Parts with open shortage record at end of study
2. Parts with an installation instruction (termed IP in Figure 13) which either doesn't
exist or is not yet applicable to the M/N reflected in the shortage record. Parts
without installation instructions are broken down into two subcategories as follows:
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a. Parts with closed shortage record at end of study
b. Parts with open shortage record at end of study
3. Parts with an uncommitted ECN against the CAD and/or CAM records (no open
shortage at end of study)
4. Standard Parts (no open shortage at end of study)
Figure 13 below shows just how each one of these groups is reflected in the sample used
for this study.
Grouping Breakdown
1%
* Normal Closed
N Normal Open
i No IP Closed
a No IP Open
56% i Standards
Uncommitted
Figure 13: Breakdown of the sample into the individual four groups (two with subgroups)
Once each record is characterized as a member of one of the four groups, the groups
are taken as a whole and averaged to create a "change map." The change map shows the
flow characteristics of that group. A change map used in this study is a Gantt chart
representation of the durations of each step in the change process, where activity durations
are represented by a black bar. Queues (i.e., time between steps that products are not in
work) are represented by the white areas between successive steps. The change map
represents the change process steps in the following order:
1. CAD ECR - duration of time from ECR begin writing to ECR approval by
change boards. This ECR is responsible for part creation.
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2. CAD ECN - duration of time from ECN initiation to ECN authorization to
schedule the part creation and approval in CAD. Upon authorization of the
ECN, the CAD can be officially approved.
3. CAD - duration of time to create the part in CAD, from part creation to part
approval.
4. CAM ECR - duration of time from ECR writing to ECR approval by change
boards. This ECR is responsible for creation and approval of the installation
instruction.
5. CAM ECN - duration of time from ECN initiation to ECN authorization to
schedule authoring of the installation instructions. Upon ECN authorization, the
installation instruction can be approved, and the change installed on a bus.
6. CAM - duration of time to create and approve the installation instruction in the
CAM system.
7. Shortage Closed Item - duration of time from shortage record creation to the
receipt of the part, resulting in the closing of the shortage record.
8. Shortage Open Item - duration of time from shortage record creation to the end
of the parts case study (only applicable to normal and no installation instruction
written part groupings). As stated earlier, these shortage records were not
cleared (i.e., parts were not received) by the end of the study.
4.3.3.1 Normal Parts
Figure 14 shows the results of the parts case study for normal parts during the
ramp up phases of the SHC program. Note that the total duration has been normalized
to 100 in order to protect the sensitivity of the data.
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Figure 14: Parts case study normalized results for normal parts during SHC ramp up
The Gantt chart in Figure 14 shows that there is a significant delay between the
completion of the CAM ECN and the start of installation instruction writing (for
simplicity, termed CAM in Figures 14 through Figure 17), accounting for 52% of the
overall total flow time. There is also a significant duration in time between the
completion of the installation instruction (end of CAM) and the opening of the shortage
record (5-10% of the total flow time). This would suggest that there was a duration of
time between when the purchase order was placed and the need date by manufacturing.
Accordingly, the amount of space between installation instruction approval (end of the
CAM bar) and shortage report start date (beginning of the shortage bar) could have been
increased by moving the installation instruction writing to the left. It would be
anticipated that a PO would be placed earlier resulting in a decreased duration of the
shortage record bar.
In addition, there were a small number of shortage records which remained open
at the end of the study (in Figure 14, these are termed "Shortage: Open Items"). These
items were split from the remainder of the data for the shortage step only in order to
more properly reflect the shortage duration. Since the closing date of the open shortage
records is unknown, it would not be prudent to leave this data in the same category as
those shortages which have a known closing date. The data in Figure 14 was
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normalized to the average end date of the closed records, which is why the data for open
items extends past 100. All other data (e.g., ECN, ECR, CAD, and CAM data) for open
shortage record items were aggregated with the data from the closed shortage record
items. This is acceptable because the only aspect that is truly different between these
two groups is the closing date of the shortage record. If these records had closed a day
before the study had ended, there would be absolutely no difference from the closed
items. The end date of the study cannot define the data or the grouping.
It is also interesting to note is that there is significant overlap between the CAD
ECN and the CAM ECN. This would suggest that a significant number of the parts in
this sample are governed by the same ECN for both the creation of the CAD part and
the creation of the CAM installation instructions. However, if all the parts were
governed by the same ECN for both CAD and CAM work, the two bars would match
perfectly. Since there is a significant overlap, it is reasonably valid to assume that over
half of the parts are governed by the ECN for both the CAD and CAM work (this is an
acceptable assumption because averages were used for this study). It will be seen in the
following sections (see Figure 15 through Figure 17) that the other groups do not have
the same tendency across CAD and CAM ECNs.
4.3.3.2 No Installation Instructions Applicable
Figure 15 below shows the parts case study results for any part shortage reports
associated with an installation instruction number that is either not written (or approved)
or the existing installation instruction number has yet to be extended to the M/N
reported in the shortage record. This figure reflects changes during the ramp up phases
of the SHC program.
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Figure 15: Parts case study results for items without an applicable installation number during SHC ramp up
The CAM step has been left blank in the above figure due to the fact that data
does not exist representing the CAM step. Shortage records that exist in this state are
odd in that they should "technically" not exist. In order for a shortage to exist, there
should usually be demand in the system. However, it is known that there is no demand
in the system for these parts because the demand is created by an approved installation
instruction and, since there is no approved installation instruction, there cannot be
demand in the ERP system.
In normal situations, once an installation instruction parts list is approved, the
CAM system then feeds the information to the ERP system, which creates a need, or
demand, for the given parts. This tells the purchasing individual that the SHC program
needs a number of parts X, Y, and Z. The purchasing individual then places purchase
orders with the supplier for the given part (if on contract, if not contracting will put a
supplier on contract for the given part) with a need date of delivery to BSS. In the
circumstances of Figure 15, without this demand in the ERP system, there must be
something informing the purchasing individual that a purchase order is needed for the
part. There are paper based workarounds of the automatic system such as advanced
ordering procedures and engineering memos. This is what is assumed to be driving the
shortage records here, potentially due to urgency of the ECNs behind the data.
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It is interesting to note in Figure 15 that the shortage records were created
immediately following the commitment of the CAM ECN. This would suggest that the
ECNs applicable to these shortage reports are either behind schedule with respect to the
manufacturing need date, or are just "very hot" ECNs. These ECNs may be important
ECNs that are needed to support critical milestones and the turnaround time for the
change needs to be very quick (i.e., management wants to get the applicable parts onsite
as quickly as possible rather than wait until the installation instructions are completed.
To circumvent this step, management manually creates these shortage records as a
driver to complete purchasing).
4.3.3.3 Uncommitted ECN
The parts characterized in this group have an ECN applicable to CAM data in the
ECN database where the latest revision available at the end of the study is uncommitted.
An uncommitted change has yet to be approved for implementation on any bus by the
CB(s). However, sometimes partners get ahead of the work before full commitment so
that engineering is ready for implementation once the ECN is approved. Figure 16
shows the parts case study results for the uncommitted ECN parts during the SHC ramp
up phase.
Uncommitted CN
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Figure 16: Change part case study results for parts without committed ECN during SHC ramp up
This is a very small percentage of the parts as can be seen in Figure 9 (around 2%
of the sample). These parts cannot technically be installed on the bus because DOT
regulation does not allow an ECN to be incorporated shipside unless the ECN has been
committed. However, these parts could be for other manufacturing jobs involving
subassemblies in the shop (i.e., it is possible that the jobs reflected in Figure 16 are jobs
done in the shop manufacturing subassemblies to be installed on the bus when the ECN
is authorized). Even though these subassemblies cannot be installed on the bus until the
ECN is committed, these shortages could ultimately have the potential to delay shipside
manufacturing jobs if subassembly shop jobs are not completed on schedule, before the
ECN is committed. In other words, shortages that occur in this situation may not delay
shipside manufacturing activities immediately, but delays can cascade down over time,
leading to a delay in shipside manufacturing activities in the future, once the ECN is
committed.
It is interesting to note that the average CAD work reflected in Figure 16 starts
before the ECN is ever opened and finished significantly before the CAD ECN is
authorized. Additionally, there is overlap between the CAD work and the ECR work
before the ECR is approved. This would suggest that the CAD work was started to
support the ECR during the initial CB reviews. It also may be due to the fact that these
changes are so critical to the manufacturing schedule that management wants to get
ahead in order to mitigate the risk of missing important milestone requirements.
4.3.3.4 Standard Parts
Standard parts are used widely across the bus and include such parts as standard
fasteners, shims, fillers, etc. What makes these parts different from the normal parts
group is that they were designed early in the program and have been used widely
throughout the bus. Figure 17 shows the change parts case study for the standard parts.
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Figure 17: Part case study results for standard parts during SHC ramp up
Figure 17 reflects no duration for the CAD ECR or CAD ECN. This is because
the authority to create these parts in CAD was not by a true ECN. The ECN typically
referenced in the CAD history was the ECN that was an authority to begin and schedule
the SHC program during the program's infant stages (they were part of the original
configuration). These parts were designed for wide implementation and therefore did
not address a change to the original bus configuration at the time of creation.
The CAM durations in Figure 17 are much more useful. Figure 17 shows that the
CAM ECN is significantly after the creation of the part. This means that the shortages
that the shortage record addresses were not part of the baseline design and the parts
were added later in SHC development through engineering change. This is also verified
through the search criteria used to generate the sample, which required an ECN letter
combination in the installation instruction field.
The same situation exists in Figure 17 as does in Figure 14, a significant time
delay between the end of the CAM ECNs and the start of the installation instruction
writing in the CAM step.
There is no conclusive evidence from Figure 17 as to the cause of the standard
parts shortages. There is significant uncertainty because of the nature of these parts.
-76-
4.3.3.5 Part Case Study Conclusion
It can be concluded that the root cause of the majority of shortages is due to the
large delay between the CAD work/CAM ECN authorization and the start of CAM
work, which ultimately creates demand in the ERP system. With more prudent action
from the ME department to complete the installation instructions earlier, these shortages
could be reduced, or even avoided. Note that there is some CAD work that is involved
in between the CAM ECN and CAM steps which is not reflected in the part case studies
(due to lack of information), but this work is considered minimal. This work typically
involves taking parts created in the CAD step (not actually creating the part in CAD),
adding a unique part instance number (unique to that part usage on the bus) linked to the
base part number and then incorporating it in a CAD document. Once this document is
created, it is sent over to MEs for the CAM work (installation instruction writing).
Potential improvement to this large delay before installation writing (which
ultimately delays part ordering) is to extract the information essentially at the end of the
CAD step. As can be seen specifically in Figure 14, the CAD work is completed just
after the CAM ECN is authorized. On average the CAD work is started just after the
CAM ECN is opened and is finished soon after the CAM ECN is authorized, but the
average CAD work is always finished significantly before the CAM work is started
(i.e., installation instruction writing). The delay after CAD work completion (before
starting CAM) allows a significant opportunity for purchasing to get ahead.
Similar conclusions can be made from Figure 15 through Figure 17 for those
groupings. However, the large delay before CAM work is constrained by the end of the
CAM ECN, rather than the CAD work. Strategies may have to be adjusted to account
for these situations.
Note that in Figure 14, CAD work on average is finished after the CAM ECN is
committed. However, the CAM ECN commit date and the CAD completion date seem
to be relatively close in this figure. Therefore, there is a significant chance that, on
occasion, the CAD work may be completed prior to committing the CAM ECN. This
could be an issue because POs cannot be placed until all ECNs are committed. The
only instances where purchasing is allowed to purchase before commitment is when
there are extenuating circumstances and resulting manual workarounds create the
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authority to purchase. This manual workaround seem to occur in Figure 15 through
Figure 17. In contrast, bypassing the installation instruction step would allow for part
information to flow to purchasing sooner, especially for the group of part shortages
which did not yet have installation instructions written against them. With proper
management of a bypass of the installation instruction writing, proper purchasing would
occur sooner than it is currently is.
4.4 Causes for Difficulties Managing Change
BSS has had a significant problem managing change, which is evident through the
significant number of shortages the SHC program has faced. There are several reasons why
this is the case, ranging from the architecture of the supply chain to the engineering IT
infrastructure to the change process itself. This section attempts to provide information
regarding the different aspects of the SHC program management that may have defined the
results of the parts case study in section 4.3.
4.4.1 Supply Chain
As stated earlier, the supply chain is much different on the SHC program than any
legacy program. In the SHC supply chain, aside from the fact that partners supply large
bus sections rather than small parts, partners now create and supply information in the
form of engineering. Compared to legacy programs where suppliers only supplied
relatively simple parts, the partners now supply both complex parts and information which
both flow through the supply chain. This makes the SHC program much more complex,
making it more difficult to track changes through the system because some changes are
internal to partners. This complicates the current structure because BSS has very little
information regarding the intent of engineering changes made internally by suppliers from
one bus to another. This becomes an issue during installation instruction writing for
partner engineered changes that must be installed at FID out of sequence work (the ECN is
the vessel used to account for this work). If an ME has to write out of sequence
installation instructions to incorporate an engineering change that requires removal and
reinstallation of a partner engineered change, the ME will have to determine the
engineering intent of the partners work in order to properly write the reinstallation
instructions. This situation makes it more difficult for the BSS ME to determine the
engineering intent of the work because BSS did not complete the engineering work for that
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ECN and may not have been informed of the engineering change (and did not need to be
informed due to SHC process requirements).
This situation could be a cause for shortages because MEs would need extra time to
write installation instructions in order to properly determine engineering intent of every
part and assembly. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the DE works for another
company which may be half way across the world and he or she may speak a different
language, making communication more difficult than ever.
In changes where partners control the design engineering but the change will be
implemented at SHC FID, the partners are required to engineer and approve the parts
before BSS can write the installation instructions that currently drive purchasing. Without
the proper approved engineered parts, BSS MEs cannot begin the installation instruction
writing step. If the engineering is not approved in sufficient time for the BSS ME to
complete installation instruction writing, this could cause part shortages by pushing the
downstream schedule to the right earlier in the process, in turn delaying parts ordering.
This was the case earlier on in the SHC program, but as can be seen in the part case
studies, on average this is not the cause of the shortages that are currently reported.
4.4.2 Change Process Accountability
The change process itself is lacking the accountability required to ensure work is
tracked, completed on time and, if late, tracked by a recovery plan. As stated in 2.1.7.1
Engineering Change Process, the legacy programs' change processes include a very
detailed implementation schedule (called an EDCS) with a detailed description of every
step required to implement the change. A deviation from the EDCS is only justified and
approved if the delay is essential to completing the change. To dissuade people from
making unjustified changes to the EDCS, the process to make a change is considered "very
painful" by engineers on legacy programs. Furthermore, since this EDCS is a public
document which can be accessed throughout the company, individual projects within
individual changes are easily tracked and individuals are accountable.
The SHC GECP attempts to recreate a document similar to the EDCS, but falls very
short. The ECN document is supposed to include all of the schedule quotes necessary to
schedule the change. However, the output from the process has historically been very
archaic and incredibly hard to follow for individuals not involved in the change itself.
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Furthermore, commonly (especially early in the program) ECN documents omitted several
of the sections required by the GECP procedure and there was no penalty for doing so.
This makes tracking anything in ECNs impossible which, in turn, makes accountability
nonexistent and accurate ECN metrics incredibly difficult to create.
Especially early in the program, it was very difficult to determine what parts were
going to be replaced by new parts in an ECN. Either the parts were buried in or were
omitted from the ECN. This makes it very difficult for anyone who needs replacement
part information, specifically purchasing, to find the information. This does not provide
sufficient part number visibility into the change process. If all replacement parts were laid
out in an easy to read format in the ECN or, even better, combined into a single database
with estimated completion dates, it would improve visibility. This information exists
somewhere (either mentally or physically, as on a piece of paper) as someone involved in
each change has to know (or at least be able to gather) all the part number information
otherwise the full change would never be completed. The information needs to be in one
place and easy to use in order to make it useful.
The lack of accountability makes change difficult because there is no easy way to
extract the information from a central document. If the information was in a central
document and everyone was made accountable to keep to their commitments, purchasing
visibility may be able to significantly improve.
4.4.3 IT Infrastructure Triggering
The IT infrastructure lacks key triggers to automatically notify the next step that the
previous step has been completed. Figure 4 in section 2.2.6.1 shows the process map for
the SHC GECP. The only true automatic trigger which exists in the entire process is the
trigger that notifies the ERP program that the ME has completed their job (the trigger
between steps 7 and 9). There is no trigger between the ECR/ECN, ECN/CAD, and
CAD/CAM steps; these steps rely on manual triggering. However, of these three
connections, the only real issue to date is the lack of trigger between the CAD/CAM steps.
The ECR/ECN exchange is not an issue because each the ECR and ECN steps typically
involve the same individuals. This is also mostly true of the ECN/CAD steps. The
individuals (or at least a representative) responsible for the CAD work are involved in the
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ECR/ECN process and have probably started some of the work by the time the ECN is
authorized. These steps, therefore, do not need a trigger to initiate the next step.
However, the CAD/CAM step does not have a trigger. An ME may not know the
DE completing the CAD work or that the CAD work is completed. This is because
information is transferred across company boundaries. Making this situation more
complex, the transfer relies on emails or telephone calls which the DE may or may not
have made. It also lacks incentive for the BSS ME to proactively obtain the information
from a partner DE.
Automatic communication sent to the ME when each part is complete, it may allow
the ME to do his work earlier and, in turn, provide purchasing the information through the
automatic demand CAM notification earlier. This would allow purchasing to place a PO
earlier and, therefore, mitigate the risk of the part becoming a shortage.
The lack of triggering makes change difficult because it complicates management of
the change process. Without consistent triggering between the DE and ME when the CAD
work to support the change is complete, the ME step will not begin. Someone must
manage the process at this step to ensure the ME is informed that installation instruction
writing can begin. It can also result in delay of all downstream steps in the change process.
4.4.4 Change Process Information Availability
Change process information is not as readily available as it needs to be. Purchasing
is only informed of part needs following notification through the automatic CAM/ERP
link. The question to ask is: where in the process is what information required to purchase
parts actually available? Is it truly after this CAM step or is it earlier in the process? Are
portions of part ordering information available at various steps or at one step? A study of
the change process was completed through interviews, change process research, and IT
infrastructure research. The following figure was created based on Figure 4 to show what
necessary part ordering information is available at what step.
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Figure 18: Change process information availability
As can be seen from Figure 18, it turns out that two steps output all of the necessary
ordering information at the ECN and CAD, which both occur before the CAM step.
Therefore, there is no value added to part ordering by waiting for CAM step completion in
order to purchase parts.
4.5 Conclusions
The GECP is not operating to the needs of the SHC program for several reasons, but the
root cause seems to be the time delay between the completion of the CAD and CAM work.
As stated earlier, there is some CAD involved in between these two steps but it is considered
minimal. In addition, all the necessary information to purchase the parts is available before
the CAM step. It could prove prudent to connect the steps that create the ordering
information with SHC purchasing in order to avoid these crippling shortages.
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4.6 Summary
This chapter presented some of the problems with the SHC General Engineering
Change Process. The problems included the high quantity of change, the lack of engineering
resources, and the addition of additional change types, namely traveled and out of sequence
work.
This chapter also addressed the issues with MMD's (purchasing's) visibility into the
engineering change process. Historically, MMD has had limited visibility into the
engineering change process. As a result, MMD did not know the engineering change parts
that would soon be flowing into their statement of work. Without this information, they
cannot properly react to the parts lead times (i.e., they don't know if a part is coming down
the information flow late, which delays ordering and ultimately manufacturing). The result is
part shortages, which are readily tracked by MMD and SHC upper management.
The parts shortage metric can be grouped in two different categories: change impacted
parts (where an engineering change added the part to the bus definition) and non-change
impacted parts (parts that are included in the baseline design). The non-change impacted part
shortages have been steadily improving but the change impacted parts have not. A parts case
study was completed to determine the root cause of these change part shortages.
A sample was taken on a random day which was used to diagnose the health of the
current engineering change process. Each part in the sample was investigated to determine
the flow time through the SHC's General Engineering Change Process. Parts that did not
have sufficient information to create a full picture were eliminated from the sample. The
remaining parts were split into four groupings based on the different characteristics of the
parts. Each group was then averaged across each step in the change process. The result was
Gantt charts that represented the flow times of the average part through the change process.
The Gantt charts showed that there was a significant time delay (which can be
considered a queue) between finishing of the CAD work and the beginning of the CAM
(installation instruction writing) work. This delay consumed the vast majority of the change
development time and ultimately delayed parts ordering, resulting in shortages.
Possible causes for this large delay in the change process are: the supply chain is much
more complex, there is a lack of accountability, there is a lack of IT infrastructure triggering,
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and there is poor change process information availability. All these aspects can help to cause
the shortage situation in the SHC program and the results reflected in the parts case study.
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5 The Change Process as a Supply Chain
The SHC GECP is essentially a supply chain but instead of creating parts, it creates
information. As can be seen from Figure 18, all of the information required to produce the
output, in this case a purchase order (rather than a part), is available with a non-value added step
in between, the installation instruction writing.23 Assume the change process was a supply chain
moving parts and there was a non-value added step in between manufacturing (creation of the
information) and shipping (PO writing) that created a large delay in the entire process (including
delays at the receiving customer) and could be completed in parallel with shipping. If this was
the case, there would be a clamor by the downstream, receiving company (manufacturing) to
make the supply chain more efficient and eliminate this step from the supply process if it has
delayed their operations. This is especially true if these parts have a long shipping duration (lead
time). However, this step exists for a reason and may be important to another group like final
inspection (ME) because this is the step in which the final inspection criteria (installation
instructions) are written. Therefore, this step could not be fully eliminated in general, just
bypassed, making it a parallel process to shipping, to get the parts to the downstream company in
a reasonable time. In other words, there is no reason to let the parts sit on the shipping dock
while these procedures are written.
If a non-value added step like the installation instruction writing existed in the actual SHC
supply chain, SHC upper management would not stand for this waste. Upper management
would demand that this step be redesigned in the process. Since it is a necessary step in the big
picture (i.e., it is value added somewhere in the program), it could not be removed, but should be
completed in parallel with value added activities. SHC upper management should demand that
the ME installation instruction writing be changed from in series to in parallel with the parts
ordering process.
This chapter aims to use the information presented in the literature review (Chapter 3) and
apply it to the current SHC change process. This section attempts to apply those supply chain
strategy elements that focus on strategy evaluation, flexibility selection, and value management
to determine where the current SHC change process may be flawed and, in turn, improved.
23Note: Installation instruction writing is non-value added to the purchasing process but value added to the SHC
program because it provides the direction necessary to install the parts necessary on the bus. Without these
instructions, mechanics would lack direction on how to install these manufacturing jobs. However, it is not needed
to place a PO.
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5.1 Supply Chain Strategy and the Change Process
5.1.1 Assessing Strategy through Evaluation
Peter Kraljic proposes five questions for management to answer when determining
their supply chain strategy (see section 3.1 Supply Chain Strategy). These five questions
will be applied to the current SHC change process strategy.
Question 1: Is the company making good use of opportunities among different
divisions and/or subsidiaries?
Instead of applying this to different divisions or subsidiaries, it should be applied to
each group involved in each step of the SHC GECP. Is the SHC program making good use
of opportunities among change boards, DEs, MEs, etc.?
It is very evident that the SHC program is leaving something on the table with the
change boards and DEs. This is evident in Figure 18, which shows that the program has
the information created by these two groups but fails to utilize the data as early as it can.
Therefore, the SHC program is not utilizing these two groups as well as it could when it
has the opportunity to extract this information and provide it to purchasing earlier.
Maximum utilization would be use of the data as soon as it is available.
Question 2: Can the company avoid anticipated supply bottlenecks and
interruptions?
Yes. The SHC program can avoid the CAM bottleneck by bypassing it and
completing installation instruction writing in parallel with purchasing procedures.
Question 3: How much risk is acceptable?
At the current state in the program, with delays of over two years, risk needs to be
mitigated. The current situation, where the program is waiting until installation
instructions are written before purchasing, is creating an incredible risk of not receiving
parts on time, resulting in shortages and bus delivery delays. This is unnecessary risk in
the system and should be mitigated in any way possible.
Question 4: What make-or-buy policies will give the best balance between cost and
flexibility?
This question does not really apply to the current situation because there is no way of
changing the engineering responsibility to or from BSS and a partner due to contractual
requirements. However, this could be reevaluated when establishing a future program. To
evaluate the strategy for a new program, management needs to ask: in what situations are
there issues with determining engineering intent or what types of parts to partners have
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trouble engineering? In situations where there are issues determining engineering intent,
the engineering of these parts should probably be taken back in-house because they
increase the time for ME work. Taking these back in-house will, in turn, decrease the risk
of shortage with the current change process structure.
Proper knowledge management of the experience on the SHC is required to prevent
the same problems from occurring on any future program. The SHC learned that the
program is flawed, but must manage this learning to ensure it is not lost after the ramp up
phase. This knowledge is explicit knowledge, and should be documented in a form that is
easily accessible to those who will be designing the next new bus design a decade down
the road, who may have forgotten the troubles of the SHC's ramp up. Whatever forms
knowledge is documented in, it must promote sharing and use of this knowledge in future
programs. A ramp up lessons learned document could suffice, but must be accessible to
the future programs and not lost in the sea of data that exists within BCB. BCB needs to
ensure that they will be able to benefit the maximum possible from the knowledge gained
through the SHC ramp up phase so that it can operate more effectively through any future
ramp up.
Question 5: To what extent might cooperation with suppliers or even competitors
strengthen long-term supply relationships or capitalize on shared resources?
Cooperation with partners is essential in the SHC GECP structure because the
partners own much of the engineering. Without partner cooperation, the SHC program
would have more problems than it has today. Partner cooperation is essential to get the
ECNs committed and CAD work complete. If these steps are not finished or finished late,
part shortages will result which will cripple the program.
These questions need to be reevaluated constantly with respect to the change process
strategy in order to determine where the change process can be improved. Without
constant improvement, the process will remain riddled with the problems. Just as supply
chains can be the source of a competitive advantage, the change processes can also be a
source of competitive advantage.
5.1.2 Determining the Change Process Flexibility
Marshall Fisher contended that there are two different types of products that require
two different types of supply chains: the functional product which requires an efficient
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supply chain and the innovative product which requires a flexible supply chain (see section
3.1).
When applied to the change process, it is easy to see that the information that flows
through the change process is an innovative product created by the GECP. The number
and focus of changes is inherently unstable just as the demand for innovative products is
unstable, both because of inaccuracies in forecasting. The change process right now is not
nearly as flexible as it needs to be because it created a significant number of shortages. By
making the change process flexible, the SHC program can hedge against any bottlenecks
due to unanticipated changes. The change process must be able react to an inherently
unstable volume of changes, without that, a large backlog (a backlog as seen prior to the
CAM step in the parts case studies) can occur delaying downstream processes.
The need for a flexible engineering change process is that much more important to
the SHC program because it is currently in the ramp up phases. During initial ramp up of
any cutting edge (i.e., innovative) product development program, the needs for the program
are unknown, which has to be anticipated by management. In the SHC's case, BSS and
partners are dealing with a material that has never been used as extensively in a coach bus
program. As a result, it is inherently unknown how this material will behave when the bus
is manufactured and fight tested. There is some shop testing that can be completed
upfront, but there is no way of accounting for every potential issue prior to manufacturing
the first bus. This fact, coupled with the new partner structure, is a very distinct signal that
the change management processes must be flexible or the change management process will
ultimately fail, creating the problems facing the SHC program. In order to minimize risk
during the ramp up phase, the change management system must be flexible in order to
account for increased numbers, increased focus (i.e., number of functional areas - bumper,
bus structure, systems, etc. - impacted), and increased scope of changes during the ramp
up phase of any bus production program.
5.1.3 Value Management
In order to reassess the change process, SHC management must determine what the
end customer values just as a supply chain managers would. Whereas some elements in a
supply chain may value on time delivery or cheaper products, SHC FID values on time and
correct delivery of parts because on time delivery allows them to complete their
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manufacturing jobs on time. Ultimately, the end customer (the bus lines) need to get their
purchased busses delivered when anticipated because they have scheduled a bus for
retirement for when the new SHC is to be delivered. Therefore, bus lines value on time
delivery of busses (and further upstream: parts) because huge delays can cripple a bus line.
In order to offer the customers the best value proposition, the SHC program needs a
change process that ensures on time delivery of parts to manufacturing. This can be
achieved by optimizing the process through continuous improvement by constantly
evaluating and reevaluating, and by increasing the change process' flexibility.
The following statement by Kraljic sums up the SHC change process and what needs
to be done to deliver the proper value proposition to the end customer:
Greater integration, stronger cross-functional relations, and more top-management
involvement are all necessary. Every facet of the purchasing organization, from
systems support to top-management style, will ultimately need to adapt to these
requirements. Concrete changes in the organization will be required to establish
effective organizational relations, provide adequate systems support, and meet new
staff and skill requirements...Too often the purchasing department receives
information on the company's business plans and objectives that is incomplete or
improperly geared to the tasks and time horizons of strategic supply management.
Purchasing executives...often lack adequate operating information with a three- to
six-month time horizon... The purchasing department needs these data for
negotiating prices, rescheduling supply quantities... In the absence of such data,
supply bottlenecks, short-term demand fluctuations, and ad hoc purchasing decisions
are inevitable. In turn, the company incurs higher time and money costs... 24
5.2 Change Process Sub Process Alignment
Internal change processes require sub processes just as a supply chain has sub
processes. Two of the "tools" that Fisher (see section 3.2 for more information) contends are
necessary to align processes are to reduce uncertainty in the future and to avoid uncertainty by
reducing lead time. Both of these are important in each of the change process' sub processes.
One sub process in the change process can be characterized as one step in the change process.
That is, the ECN step is a sub process, the CAD work is a sub process, the writing of a PO is a
sub process, etc.
The sub processes need to each be aligned to support the ultimate goal of delivering
correct changes to manufacturing, on time, to support the production schedule. Each of these
24 Kraljic, Peter. "Purchasing must become supply management." Harvard Business Review 61, no. 5 (September
1983): 116. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 18, 2009)
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sub processes can be specifically aligned to support this goal by providing information to the
subsequent sub processes in the most efficient way possible. This can be accomplished
through automatic means such as electronic signals sent when a part is approved or through
manual means such as the dissemination of an ECN document to the affected parties.
Whatever the means of communication is, it must be effective with the most useful and
correct information.
Proper communication is incredibly important. As stated by Dittmann and Mello in
chapter 31 in the Handbook of Global Supply Chain Management, a proper communication
plan is the most critical aspect of change management (for more details please refer to section
3.4.1). Without the proper communication method individually tailored to each individual or
group, the message (i.e., relevant information that each group needs to act on) will be lost in
the flood of information that employees receive every day. The result of ineffective
communication can mean delays in the change process or, at worst, failure to complete the
engineering change.
Dittmann and Mello continue to say that there are four roles which are incredibly
important to implement any organizational change: the sponsor, change owner, change
manager, and process owner. Although Dittmann and Mello are using these roles to describe
implementing organizational changes, these same roles can be applied to engineering change.
The SHC process currently has all four of these functional roles in the engineering change
process. They are as follows:
* The sponsor - engineer leading the change, provides the engineering justification for
the change
* Change Owner - the change board head, termed the change coordinator in the SHC
change process
* Change Manager(s) - individual function leads. These would be the DE and ME
managers who are managing the work completed to support the change by their direct
reports
* Process leads - the individual contributors, either individual DEs or MEs, who
complete the detailed work which support the implementation of the change
Some of the roles are not performed well enough, resulting in the current state of the
SHC engineering change process. Specifically, the change owner and change manager
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functions have not been performed to the level necessary for the SHC program to succeed.
The change owner (i.e., change coordinator) is needed to ensure the engineering change as a
whole is completed in a reasonable amount of time (i.e., within the schedule, without
impinging on part lead time) which is definitely not happening, especially with respect to the
installation instruction writing. Also, the change managers (individual ME and DE leads) are
not ensuring their people are completing their work on time to support the change owner.
This is very evident through the very large queue in Figure 14 before the CAM work and the
resulting shortages.
In order to improve this situation, the change owner needs to work with the change
managers and create tailored communications providing detailed requirements for the
completion of the change's tasks. Dittmann and Mello contend that these communications
should, at a minimum, include clearly defined tasks, individual responsibilities, and schedules
with clear completion dates. This is very similar to the requirements of the EDCS employed
in the legacy programs. Other details which may be useful in communications include contact
information for the adjacent sub processes and a standard format for communication to each
group across all changes.
5.3 Chapter Summary
The SHC's General Engineering Change Process is essentially a supply chain of change
information. As with true supply chains, the change process needs a strategy in order to
ensure that the process fits with the company's product and industry. The fit of the change
process should be evaluated by using some of the same evaluation methods used for supply
chains. For example, BSS needs to question the current SHC engineering change process
strategy using the questions posed by Peter Kraljic. The information provided by the answers
will show where the holes in the process are and then can be used to correct the process.
It is evident that change information in the ramp up phases is essentially an innovative
product flowing through the change process. Therefore, the change process needs to be
inherently flexible to account for the unknown amount of change information that will flow
through the system. Without a flexible change process, there is no way to properly react to
high levels of change information which can occur during the ramp up phase.
BSS needs to evaluate the change process using these techniques for the SHC program.
It is important to ensure alignment of the change process with the ramp up phase so that BSS
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can accommodate the needs of the end-customer, the bus lines. Without taking into account
the needs a customer that values on time delivery, the change processes goal needs to be
aligned to deliver a value proposition that aligns to the customers' needs. These techniques
will help BSS achieve the proper value proposition alignment with customers.
The lessons learned from the SHC ramp up need to be managed by BSS to ensure any
new program in the future has change process alignment during the ramp up phase. Without
proper knowledge management of the SHC problems and corrective actions, BSS is at risk for
the same problems in future programs.
The sub processes of the SHC's General Engineering Change Process need to be
aligned to support the ultimate goal of delivering engineering change parts to manufacturing,
on time (i.e., before or on the manufacturing need date). Information throughout the change
process must be transferred efficiently and correctly in an effective manner. The current
reliance on manual triggers and change board meetings has not sufficed as proper
communication methods because they are not tailored to effectively and efficiently transfer
the information to each stakeholder. Manual transfer of information lacks the accountability
while the change boards focus predominantly on the engineering, where the part ordering
information is typically lost in the slew of engineering jargon used in these meetings. The
communication of ECN requirements needs to be tailored to each stakeholder otherwise the
process will remain ineffective.
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6 Temporary Solution
A temporary solution was employed to immediately help improve this situation. This
temporary solution gathered all the information necessary to purchase parts from the change
process to create an advanced ordering report which purchasing can act on. The initial launch of
the report was for the most critical M/Ns, M/Ns 1-6. The report was then expanded to also cover
releases for M/Ns 7-25. This report was used by SHC purchasing to place POs for those part
numbers included on the report. Figure 19 below shows how this advanced ordering report fit
into the SHC's engineering change process and what data it extracted from which step.
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Figure 19: Change process representation with advanced ordering report
As can be seen, the advanced ordering report connects the information available at the
ECN and CAD steps with purchasing so the purchase order can be written. Essentially, it puts
purchase order writing in parallel with installation instruction writing. This allows purchasing to
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get ahead and place the purchase orders before the ME writes and submits the installation
instruction that creates the demand in the ERP system.
6.1 Details of the Report
This report provides the following information to the purchasing individuals in a
website format:
1. Part number quantity by design responsibility, including any part numbers which are
suppressed (i.e., cannot be purchased for reasons such as it is a collector part number).
This gives the user the quantity of parts against a given partner
2. A detailed breakdown of the parts which can and cannot be purchased. These part
numbers are broken down into the following subcategories by design responsibility.
These sub categories are intended to track where part numbers are in the pre-purchase
process and to ensure accountability. Each one of the sub categories can be opened in
excel format by clicking on a link to see exactly what parts are behind each metric.
a. Total items not ready (cannot be purchased because pre-purchase work is
incomplete).
b. Items not ready because it has not been added to the ERP system.
c. Items not ready because the part is not on contract yet.
d. Items not ready because quality has yet to approve.
e. Items not ready because supplier coding in ERP has not been completed.
f. Items ready for PO.
3. A dropdown menu where each purchasing individual can view the part numbers that
they are responsible for.
4. A graphical representation of the overall performance to the report showing lines for.
a. Total POs required.
b. Actual POs placed.
The spreadsheets linked to this website provide the following information for each part in the
report:
1. Part number.
2. Design responsible company.
3. ECN(s) applicable to the part number.
4. Milestone parts needed to support (e.g., first drive).
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5. The M/Ns the part number is applicable to.
6. Part class (high level description of what the part is).
7. Date added.
8. Quantity by M/N.
9. Total quantity.
This report is on the BSS intranet and can easily be accessed by any purchasing individual
who is responsible for executing POs.
6.2 Benefits
This report allows the SHC program to optimize the current change process by
providing all the data to purchasing as soon as it is complete. This report gives SHC
purchasing the advantage of not having to wait until ME has processed the installation
instructions; it allows MMD to work in parallel with that step altogether. When compared to
the change process case study results of Figure 14, half of the process flow can potentially be
eliminated. This is essentially doing what Terwiesch and Loch said in their article "Managing
the Process of Engineering Change Orders: The Case of the Climate Control System in
Automobile Development": it is eliminating congestion through eliminating an unnecessary
step in the purchase order sub process.
Even if ME reduces its queue to a much lesser percentage of the process flow time in
the future, this report will still allow purchasing to start the purchase order process (i.e.,
setting up ERP, putting the parts on contract, parts quality approved, etc.) earlier. Therefore,
if the information does flow through to the ERP system before the PO is placed, purchasing
will be physically much closer to actually placing the PO than if they had waited for the
automatic signal.
This report, at a minimum, is a forecast of what parts should be expected to flow
through to the ERP system from CAM in the future. If management decides, for whatever
reason, that this report should not be acted upon, it will at least provide purchasing with a list
of parts that it should expect to soon see coming into the ERP system in the form of demand.
6.3 Risks
The ERP system is not currently set up to fully accept this report. When a PO is placed
for part X on this advanced ordering report, the ERP system reports an error saying that
purchasing currently has excess part X and tells the purchasing individual that he or she
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should cancel this order because supply exceeds demand. There is a risk that purchasing
individuals would cancel this PO for part X because the ERP system is telling them to do so.
Although it is not catastrophic if the individual cancels that order, it puts the SHC program
back into the same position it is currently. This error message is eliminated when the actual
demand flows into the ERP system from the CAM system. Proper training on the cause of
this error message will ensure that the PO will not be unnecessarily canceled.
There is risk that the parts could be ordered too early. The best need by date generated
by the report is based on the milestone date provided in the ECN. The milestone date is not a
manufacturing need date but rather an event by which the change needs to be incorporated.
The most reliable estimate for a need date for these parts would be approximately a month
before the day milestone is scheduled. Therefore, BSS could potentially be stuck with
unnecessary inventory for a month. Conversely, a month is a small percentage of the SHC's
current delays. This is not considered an important risk because the program is so far behind
that early parts are much better than risking receipt later than the need date. Mitigation at this
point in the program is, therefore, considered unnecessary.
There is also risk of manual error. The current report is not very user friendly since it is
excel based. There is a lot of manual transcription involved, from part number to contract
numbers. A system that is manual, especially with complex number and letter combinations,
is susceptible to human error. An example situation where this could hurt the SHC program is
if a purchasing individual were to purchase an incorrect part number because either the report
or the individual had the number incorrect. The result could be that the SHC program
receives inventory of a part number that it may never use. This situation is not unheard of in
the current system because some of the installation instruction writing involves transcription
of part numbers and data, but care should be taken by the purchasing individual to ensure
manual inputs are correct.
Another potential risk is that the design partner associated with the part number on the
report may not be the correct company to purchase from. During the ECN development
process, BSS and the designing partner decide on an M/N in the future to install the change
in-sequence at the partner. All M/Ns before this typically will have the change installed out
of sequence at SHC FID. At this point in ECN development, BSS and the partner come to an
agreement on who will provide the parts for the out of sequence installations at FID.
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Typically, the partner will fabricate (or outsource the fabrication) the parts and supply them to
BSS. However, sometimes BSS and the partner will come to an agreement that states BSS
will source the parts from an outside vendor for all out of sequence installations. With the
POs being placed to the partner, there is risk that the partner may receive the PO and not act
on it because they don't think that they are responsible for those parts as agreed upon in the
ECN negotiation phase.
This report will correct a situation which has occurred in the past where BSS was
supposed to source from the partners for the out of sequence M/Ns but didn't end up doing so.
Instead, BSS found an outside vendor and sourced the out of sequence parts from them while
the partner was left with an inventory of parts that BSS was supposed to purchase.
6.4 Results
After implementation of this report through the end of the internship, approximately
40% of the parts on this report had POs written against them. Essentially, 40% of the parts
provided on this report had been purchased earlier than if the current SHC IT infrastructure,
as designed, had been allowed to work as designed.
However, the impact on shortages is much harder to quantify because it is unknown
how much of the 40% would have resulted in a shortage. Figure 20 below shows a large view
of the last quarter of the X axis of Figure 6. This area reflected in Figure 20 corresponds to
the time period just after the implementation of this report (see inset).
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Figure 20: Exploded view of Figure 6, right quarter of X-axis
It is interesting to note that, after a significant time being relatively flat (see Figure 6),
shortages associated with change started to decrease. The cause for this decrease is
inconclusive. However, it is probable that the advanced ordering report temporary had an
impact on shortages creating this change in the trend.
6.5 Summary
The temporary solution is intended to be a simple patch to improve the SHC's
engineering change process purchasing. The aim of this temporary solution is to provide part
ordering information to purchasing earlier in the change process by extracting the data from
various internal BSS databases. This report delivers information to purchasing before it flows
through the normal IT channels. This gives purchasing the ability to react earlier (potentially
significantly earlier) to parts needs by placing purchase orders for items earlier than they
ordinarily would have.
This report is a very manual workaround of the normal process, and there are risks
when using this new report. The risks include:
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* Unintentional cancellation of purchase orders placed off this report
* Ordering parts too early
* Transcription errors
* Purchasing from the wrong partner
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7 Long Term Solution Options
This section presents several options which, if implemented, can potentially improve the
engineering change parts visibility problem in the long term. The options presented here are
intended to be user friendly alternatives of and improvements to the short term solution. Certain
options will provide information that is not currently provided in the short term solution, making
some more useful than the short term solution. These options will be used to create a long term
recommendation for the SHC program in chapter 8.
7.1 Earlier Demand Creation
Using the very manual temporary advanced ordering report to place POs in the ERP
system will result in error messages telling purchasing individuals to cancel orders for these
items. An option to eliminate this issue would be to connect demand to a CAD release in lieu
of a CAM release. This would eliminate a lot of the manual work currently needed to place a
PO off the advanced ordering report. As a result, it will reduce the number of transcription
errors. The connection between CAM and ERP currently automates a lot of the ERP data
creation and pre-purchase process. The same type of application could be incorporated to
connect the CAD release and ERP demand creation.
The current CAD and ERP systems have the appropriate architecture to accept this type
of connection. Both systems fundamentally run off the same part tracking coding. Both
systems use a part code known as a "part instance" which is a series of numbers that is unique
to every single part on the bus, no matter the part number. For example, if there are 100 part
Xs on M/N 4, there will be 100 different part instance numbers to cover the 100 part Xs. If 75
of M/N 4's part Xs are used on M/N 5 in the same place on the bus but M/N 5 has an
additional 40 more of part X installed in a different way on the bus, 75 of the part instance
numbers of M/N 5 would match 75 of the M/N 4 part instance numbers. The additional 40
will have unique part instance numbers that do not match any other instance number for part
X on any other M/N that does not use this part number in the same exact way. A computer
application could easily be created to link these part instance numbers between the CAD and
ERP systems just as the current CAM/ERP system connection does. The CAM/ERP system
link can still be used to validate the data coming from CAD to ERP and to assign the
installation instruction number, but would provide little added value.
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7.2 Detailed ECN Schedules
A detailed ECN schedule similar to the EDCS of the legacy programs for each ECN
would prove useful to create metrics and a sense of accountability throughout the program.
This could also be used to track exactly what parts are intended to be released in the future.
This would provide a significant document to ensure that work is completed and, if not on
time, show which area is the offending area. The ECN owner could then work with the
offending area to create a recovery plan in an attempt to minimize the impact of the delay on
the program.
7.3 Forecasting Reports
The SHC program could create a document that provides the part numbers scheduled to
be released over a given horizon. If a report was provided to SHC purchasing which showed
all parts scheduled to be released from CAD over the next 60 days and those which are behind
schedule, it would provide purchasing the proper visibility into future purchases. In addition,
it would allow purchasing to determine lead times before engineering approval for all of these
parts and make purchases as necessary to support manufacturing. The part would require a
special engineering approval in order to actually place the PO before CAD approval. Early
ordering approval can be granted by engineering if the design is at a high fidelity but this is at
risk of future part definition changes. If early ordering permission is not granted in time,
purchasing would at least have advanced notice that part engineering will be late and could
work with the supplier to attempt to reduce lead time.
This forecast would most easily be implemented in conjunction with a strict scheduling
procedure proposed in section 7.2. It would be simple to extract all part numbers and
scheduled completion dates from a detailed and well organized schedule. Provided that the
schedule is created in a relatively flexible computer program, it could be possible to
automatically (i.e., electronically through the use of an in-house created computing program)
extract all the required information (part number, quantity, completion date, etc.) from the
scheduling program. If completion dates need to change and are changed for a given part, the
extraction program could be used to catch any completion date slippage and inform
purchasing of the revised completion date, showing the new estimated completion date with
the original date followed in parenthesis.
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Newly developed SHC ECNs are being created in a program which documents all the
new part numbers to be added and the part numbers to be removed by the ECNs, in a more
user friendly format. This is an improvement over the old ECN documents which either
doesn't include part number information or buries the information within the document. This
new program could potentially be used to generate a forecast of parts to be completed by
ECNs. However, this document lacks anticipated completion dates for CAD work.
Therefore, using this document to create a forecasting document would be of limited value.
It would only provide part numbers contained in an ECN, not the expected date of completion
for the CAD work.
7.4 Require Purchasing Participation in Change Board Meetings
Purchasing involvement in change board meetings could be beneficial in that parts
added are typically discussed during the ECR and ECN change board phases. However, these
discussions are typically very technical, too technical for the average purchasing individual
(most do not come from an engineering background). In addition, these meetings are so
frequent (due to the number of ECNs) and purchasing is so small (relative to an ME or DE
function's size) that covering this meeting would require too large a percentage of
purchasing's manpower resources. Additionally, an ECN may cover areas that several
purchasing individuals have cognizance over. This would require multiple purchasing
individuals or transfer of second hand information to the appropriate individual from a
representative that may not be very keen on those parts.
The amount of benefit to purchasing derived by attending these meetings may not prove
to be worth the value of the manpower used to attend because there are other, less manpower
intensive options available that could provide more information, in quantity and robustness, to
purchasing.
In addition, this CB meeting is not aimed directly at purchasing. Using the
requirements for change communication criteria presented in section 3.4.1, this meeting is not
a good choice to communicate requirements of the change to purchasing because it is not
tailored to purchasing's needs in any way.
7.5 Stay the Course
Another option for the SHC program would be to keep the same systems in place that
have created this problem with the hope that the different SHC groups will figure out how to
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properly manage their statement of work in order to attain the goals set forth by upper
management. This would be the easiest to implement because it would require no change by
employees. However, the risk that the situation does not improve is very high. If
management wants to take a proactive approach to fixing the part shortage situation then they
need to implement improvement initiatives aimed at increasing the chance of successful
improvement of engineering change parts ordering.
7.6 Summary
There are several options that could potentially improve this situation in the long term.
The options are as follows:
1. Create demand earlier: by connecting demand in the ERP system with CAD release in
lieu of CAM release will avoid the cancellation messages and manual transcription
required by the temporary report. Requires IT infrastructure changes, potentially
significant changes.
2. Include detailed schedules in all new ECN documents: detailed schedules on par with
the EDCS of the legacy programs will help ensure accountability and ease of tracking.
3. Forecasting reports: a report that is provided to purchasing which contains all the parts
to be released from CAD over a given horizon. This report can be used by purchasing
to plan for any work that will be soon coming their way. This option would be most
easily implemented in conjunction with the detailed ECN schedule.
4. Require purchasing participation in the current change board meetings: parts
requirements are discussed in the change board meetings. However, these meetings are
typically very technical and any information pertaining to purchasing is buried in the
conversation.
5. Remain with the current infrastructure: hope that the stakeholders involved determine
how to properly manage to the performance goals dictated by upper management.
-104-
8 Long Term Recommendations
Chapter 7 presents some options which can be implemented by the SHC program in order
to improve the parts shortage situation the program is currently facing. These recommendations
can be used to both improve the SHC program and to help avoid similar situations from
occurring on future new coach program launches (i.e., the next all new coach bus BSS and its
partners design and manufacture).
It is recommended that the SHC program implement a stringent scheduling routine that is
aimed at scheduling all steps required for each ECN, implement a digital forecasting tool that can
be used by purchasing to determine upcoming needs, and to create earlier demand in the ERP
system. Each of these three programs should be implemented in the order presented in the
preceding sentence in order to properly balance all the needs of the program with the needs of
the future situation. In addition, each subsequent step can use information from the preceding
step to improve functionality. The aim of this long term recommendation is to reduce the
complexity and the congestion effects of the process upstream of purchasing. This happens to
be in-line with recommendations provided by Terwiesch and Loch.
The SHC should not stay the course because it will not improve the problem. It should
also not require purchasing to attend these CB meetings because it is not the right forum or
method to communicate new, removed and revised parts to them. The solution in this section
would be an effective solution for communicating the essence of the part requirements for
purchase.
8.1 Step 1: Implement Detailed Scheduling for all New ECNs
Ensuring that all new ECNs have a detailed and accountable schedule will ensure that
every step in the ECN is properly tracked. It may not be feasible to create a schedule for all
past ECNs because there are a significant number of them, there are several which have
disjointed information, and many are already complete. The manpower required to collect,
analyze, and format the information from all the ECNs would be prohibitive. However, all
new ECNs should have a stringent, easy to read schedule as part of their contents, similar to
the legacy engineering/design commitment schedule (EDCS).
To ensure every ECN document has this, the SHC program must import the same
change management style of the legacy programs. The legacy programs have excelled under
the EDCS and the management style, and this needs to be applied to the SHC program. The
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most efficient way to accomplish this is to obtain the change managers from the legacy
programs to oversee the SHC change process transformation. These individuals are integral
to the success of this initiative because they have the knowledge about how to properly
manage an engineering change process within BSS Coach Busses.
The main benefit of this improvement is that it can have a large impact on the entire
program, bigger than an impact on just the purchasing area. This document can be used to
create metrics for each area (ME, DE, purchasing, partners) and group (individual groups
within ME, DE, purchasing) to see where problems exist. Where problems do exist, SHC
management can properly address those problems and correct them before they become too
big. For example, in a hypothetical situation, if partner A is routinely late when completing
CAD work, BCB and partner A can hold a kaizen event and work together to properly
diagnose the problem and correct it. If the problem at partner A is diagnosed as a manpower
issue, BCB can work with partner A to get the resources it needs (through hiring, redesigning
processes to use less manpower, etc.) to fix the problem.
In addition to accountability, this schedule can be used by the downstream steps to
determine when they should be starting work on a given ECN. This will ensure
communication between the adjacent steps because the subsequent steps are hinging on the
completion of the preceding steps to complete their jobs on time. If a subsequent step does
not communicate with a preceding step and the preceding step is late, the subsequent step will
ultimately be late which will be reflected on all subsequent steps' metrics. A late start due to
previous steps late finish will require the subsequent steps to move their starting point
accordingly and inform the processes downstream that there will be a delay upstream in order
to meet metric requirements. This will ultimately benefit purchasing because they will see the
"hiccups" in the schedule upstream and will be able to adjust accordingly. Of course, any
schedule shift must have a valid reason and CB approval to take effect.
Another benefit occurs when creating the schedule. The schedule will ultimately be
driven by the bus delivery date because there are large financial and intangible (e.g., customer
satisfaction which may impact a future purchase) penalties for delayed delivery. However,
the true date driving the ECN will be the manufacturing need date for the job which supports
the delivery date. To create a proper schedule, the SHC program must use this manufacturing
need date and backfill (from right to left on a physical schedule) all previous steps required to
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implement this change. When this is completed, it may show that the start by date for the first
step has already passed, and individual steps must be compressed (e.g., through use of
overtime) to support the manufacturing need date. If this issue is realized earlier in the
process, it can be mitigated and there will be less risk of a part shortage.
8.2 Step 2: Create Forecasting Site
A forecasting webpage on the BCB intranet or a tracking program would create a user
friendly forum for purchasing and ME to detail the work that will be flowing downstream
over the next 60 days. Accordingly, the webpage/program needs to be capable of being
filtered by individual manager and individual contributor (e.g., individual purchasing
individual who will ultimately make the purchase) responsibility so metrics can be created to
track an individual's and group's future responsibilities. This gives purchasing a great view
of what is coming down the pipeline so that individuals can do pre-purchase work as
necessary to ensure that the PO is released as soon as it is needed.
This webpage/program will be backfilled from the data included on the detailed
schedules created for each new ECN. The webpage/program would take each individual part
number, part instance number, purchasing individual responsibility, estimated CAD
completion date, purchase by date, part lead time, ECN number, and manufacturing need date
by M/N from the detailed schedule and compile it into a user friendly online database. In
addition, if any dates are adjusted upstream from purchasing, it would be reflected in the
forecast and purchasing can react accordingly, potentially working with the suppliers to
reduce lead time of parts.
Once the part is approved in CAD, the part number will disappear from this site, but
will appear in an associated site where all of the parts approved in CAD over the past 60 days.
A separate link to a subpage will exist which will include historical approval data. This will
ensure that purchasing does not lose track of the part once the part is eliminated from the
forecasting report.
8.3 Step 3: Create Demand Earlier
Concurrently with addition to the recently approved site, the parts will be added to ERP
system in the form of demand. The purchasing individual would see these parts on the ERP
screen with all of his or her part responsibilities. Each part would have a pre-demand column,
an intermediate demand column, and a true demand column with numbers representing the
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quantity in each category. The pre-demand column would serve as a signal to the purchasing
individual that a part has flowed through the CAD system but not yet the CAM system. The
purchasing individual would then investigate any pre-demand to determine the actual
purchase by date. This investigation should be easy as the purchasing individual should be
aware of the need for the part through the forecasting site. If the purchase by date is
determined to be approaching (e.g., less than two weeks from the current day), the purchasing
individual would promote the applicable part instance number(s) to intermediate demand,
which signals that a PO has been placed to cover a pre-demand. Any parts which had been
approved by CAM would flow through the system and move the matching part instance
number from either the pre-demand or intermediate demand (depending on if a PO was
previously placed for that instance) to the true demand column. Figure 21 describes the
common situation which the purchasing individual might face and the proper corrective
actions.
Each part number would have a quantity of supply against it (which it currently does in
the ERP system) which consists of the sum of the quantities of the item in stock and the
quantity currently on PO waiting for receipt. The supply column in ERP should match the
sum of the intermediate demand and demand columns. Anytime the supply column is less
than the sum of the intermediate demand and demand columns, the purchasing individual
would know that they need to increase the quantity on the purchase order in order to cover the
demand.
Situation Proper Reaction by Purchasing
Pre-demand Investigate purchase by date
Pre-demand - purchase by date far in Note purchase by date, leave as pre-demand
future (i.e., >2 weeks out)
Pre-demand - purchase by date past or in Place appropriate PO, advance pre-demand to
near future (i.e., <2 weeks out) intermediate demand
Approval by CAM Pre- or intermediate demand will be
automatically advanced to true demand. Place
POs for any discrepancy between sum of
intermediate demand and demand
Sum of intermediate demand and Place POs to account for discrepancy
demand columns do not sum to supply
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Figure 21: Purchasing reaction to common situations involving pre-demand, intermediate demand, and demand
8.4 Summary
Figure 22 serves as a graphical representation of the flow through the CAD, CAM,
ERP, and new applications for the proposed long term solution. The figure details the inter-
program connections between each new step and existing steps through dotted lines. The
notes following the figure explain the significance of each new interconnection.
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Figure 22: Graphical representation of recommended new change management system
Notes (correspond to numbers in red boxes in Figure 22):
1. Once the ECN is approved by the change board, the schedule created in the ECN step is
official and can be acted upon by the downstream processes (specifically CAD work).
All changes to the schedule must also be approved by the change board.
2. The essence of the schedule will be created during the ECN creation period but needs
CB approval to proceed with schedule implementation.
3. The schedule is used to populate the forecast. Every part on every detailed schedule to
be approved during the following 60 day period will be reflected on this report. This
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report will also reflect any delays and any parts that are delinquent on their CAD
approval. The forecast will include the following details:
a. Part number.
b. Quantity.
c. Part instance number(s).
d. Responsible purchasing individual.
e. Estimated CAD completion date.
f. Purchase by date.
g. Manufacturing need date.
h. ECN number.
4. Once a part is approved in CAD, the schedule will be updated to show a completed
task. The forecast page/program data will be adjusted to remove that part from the
rolling 60 day forecast, while the approval page will gain that part number (all
applicable part instances that have been approved in CAD). The approval page will
include the same part information as note 3, but "estimated CAD completion date" will
change to "actual CAD completion date" and include any other part information that
may have been created during the part design phase in CAD. This will also be a rolling
60 day report so that users have a 60 day history of CAD approvals. Archived
information from outside the 60 days will be available through a separate link.
5. In parallel with the update of the approval page, a signal will be sent to the ERP system
to create pre-demand. In the ERP interface, the part number will have three quantity
columns against under the demand heading. The first will be pre-demand which is the
quantity of any part number instance approved in CAD which does not have a
manufacturing instruction written for it or a PO issued against it. Items in this category
will be investigated using the approval page to determine purchase by dates.
6. Upon completion of investigation by the purchasing individual, he or she may uncover
that part instances may need to be purchased because their purchase by date is
occurring very soon (within 2 weeks) or has already passed. These part instances have
a PO written against them to purchase those items. Once these POs are written and
submitted, the purchasing individual reduces the pre-demand quantity by the quantity
reflected in the PO. This is done by selecting the part instance numbers in ERP the POs
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account for, and then transfer the numbers behind the scenes to the intermediate
demand column (this capability will have to be added with the same ERP revision that
will create the three demand groupings). The intermediate demand field will
automatically increase by the same number the pre-demand field was reduced by. The
intermediate demand field represents any CAD approved part instance that has a PO
written against it but does not have a manufacturing instruction written against it. This
will make the PO writing occur in parallel or before installation instruction writing.
7. Upon installation instruction approval, a signal (which currently exists in the IT
infrastructure) will be sent to the ERP system to create "true" demand - essentially the
demand that purchasing individuals see and act on in the baseline system. The signal
from CAM will automatically adjust downward the quantity in either the pre-demand or
intermediate demand basket, depending on which group the applicable part instance
number(s) are in. A resulting automatic increase of the quantity in the "true" demand
basket will also occur in the same quantity the other two baskets were decreased. If the
sum of the intermediate demand and the true demand column do not add up to the
supply column, the purchasing individual will know that recently some of the pre-
demand had been reassigned as true demand and now needs a PO to account for the
discrepancy. An automatic signal will be sent to the purchasing individual to eliminate
the discrepancy if this situation does occur. This would be similar to the current
automatic signal sent to purchasing individuals if existing supply is smaller than
demand.
8.5 Summary
This chapter presented a proposed future state of the ordering system that would help
prevent shortages associated with engineering change. This long term solution is not simple
and would require a lot of manpower and training to implement. It may require significant
capital to create and implement the computing systems that will link the different elements of
the change process. The following summarizes the steps needed to implement this long term
solution.
1. Implement detailed ECN scheduling: This is completed first because it has the benefit
of creating both accountability and an easy to use schedule for every stakeholder in the
process. Scheduling requirements akin to the EDCS of the legacy programs should be
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implemented as soon as possible because it will only cover new ECNs as it would be
very time intensive to retrofit all ECNs which have already been developed. The
implementation of a detailed schedule requirement will set the stage for the following
steps.
2. Create a forecasting site: A website or application which purchasing individuals can
easily access via the BCB intranet that provides a forecast of the parts which are
scheduled to be released from CAD over the next 60 days. Each part on this site will
have an associated purchasing individual's name attached to it so responsible
individuals can filter by purchase responsibility. An associated page will account for
all the parts approved in the past 60 days so purchasing does not lose track of parts
which have been approved. Purchasing will be able to access a history archive of CAD
approvals via this page.
3. Create demand earlier in ERP: Linking CAD approval directly to ERP demand will
eliminate the cancel PO messages received by purchasing in the short term solution.
Once approved in CAD, a signal will be sent to ERP to create demand. There are three
buckets of demand that need to be created. They are as follows:
a. Pre-demand: Demand that has been created by CAD approval but does not have
either an approved installation instruction in CAM or a PO against these part
instances
b. Intermediate demand: Demand created by CAD that does not have an approved
installation instruction in CAM, but does have a PO placed for these part instances
c. Demand: Demand approved in CAD and has an applicable installation instruction
approved in CAM. May or may not have a PO against them. In order to determine
if a PO is needed, the purchasing individual must sum the intermediate demand and
demand and compare to the supply value (which includes items in stock and items
on PO). If the sum is less than the supply value, POs need to be placed to cover the
discrepancy.
Optimal visibility for the SHC's Materials Management Department will hopefully be
the result of this implementation of a knowledge infrastructure to support knowledge sharing.
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9 Summary and Conclusion
The SHC program's problems with shortages (and resulting two year delay) could have
been avoided with the proper foresight and planning. These shortages during the SHC's ramp up
were caused by insufficient alignment of the change management sub processes. Other aspects
impacting the performance of the current system are lack of accountability, lack of processes to
support proper purchasing visibility, and lack of proper triggers. The result of these elements is
the significant number of shortages which has plagued the SHC program throughout its history.
When designing a change management system, it is essential that it be treated as important
as the supply chain which it will support. It is just as important to have a flexible change
management system as it is to have a flexible supply chain for any innovative product. If the
change management system is not sufficiently flexible the change management system will
suffer just as a supply chain would suffer if the supply chain itself was not sufficiently flexible.
This is especially true during the ramp up phase of any innovative product because the nature of
these innovative products is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty is always greatest during the ramp
up phase of a product, especially when a company and its partners have very little experience
with the product's materials. It is therefore necessary to design both the change management and
supply chain processes to have the flexibility to overcome the uncertainty of the most risky part,
the ramp up, where the company is still learning about the product and materials. Once the ramp
up phase has passed, there will be more flexibility in the change process than BSS needs. BSS
will then be able to focus on making the change process more efficient when this time comes.
Management can use the same supply chain strategy principles to design the engineering
change management system. The change management system must be treated as a supply chain
because it is essentially an information supply chain. Instead of transferring material and parts
downstream, the change management system transfers different types of information of different
fidelity to the sub processes downstream. By implementing supply chain strategy techniques,
management can ensure the change management processes are aligned with the needs of the
supply chain and any stakeholders impacted by the change process.
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Appendix 2: Acronym Glossary
BCB BSS Coach Busses
BP Broad Power
BSS Bus Solution Systems
CAD Computer Aided Design
CAM Computer Aided Manufacturing
CB Change Board
CIB Change Incorporation Board
DE Design Engineer
DOT Department of Transportation
EDCS Engineering/Design Commitment Schedule
ECN Engineering Change Notice
ECR Engineering Change Request
GECP General Engineering Change Process
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning
FID Final Integration to Delivery
ISE In-Service Entertainment
IP Installation Instruction
IT Information Technology
LATC Lithuanian Autobus and Transportation Conglomerate
M/N Manufacturing Number
ME Manufacturing Engineer
MES Manufacturing Execution System
MMD Materials Management Department
PI Papelbon Integration
PO Purchase Order
REDR Revised Engineering Design Report
SAC Super Alpha Coach
SBC Super Beta Coach
SCC Super Charlie Coach
SCP Seoul Collision Protection
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Super Delta Coach
Super Foxtrot Coach
Super Golf Coach
Super Hotel Coach
Shortage Tracking Tool
Tokyo Bus Construction
The CAD/CAM People
Venice Bus Solutions
Yellow School Bus Systems
SDC
SFC
SGC
SHC
STRACK
TBC
TCCP
VBS
YSBS
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